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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Jamaican Ethnic Oneness: Race, Colorism, and Inequality 
 
By 
 
Monique Deeann Asandra Kelly 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Professors Ruben Rumbaut and Stanley Bailey, Co-Chairs 
 
 
 
My dissertation analyzes racial and skin color stratification in Jamaica, the impact of an ideology 
of racial mixing on Jamaican’s explanation for that inequality, and racial and nation-based 
identification. Using the Americas Barometer social survey on Jamaica (a comprehensive and 
nationally representative dataset), the census, and original, qualitative, semi-structured interviews, 
I examine: (1) the parameters of Jamaican national identity, (2) Jamaican nationalism and its 
influences on perceptions of racial and color prejudice and discrimination, and (3) the structuring 
of socioeconomic well-being along racial and color lines. I find that the ideology of racial 
mixing/fusion or creolization strongly influences understandings of Jamaican national identity 
and of race. While issues pertaining to both race and colorism are not blatantly denied, race is 
generally viewed as a “U.S. problem,” while colorism is considered centrally an issue of the 
nation’s past. Instead, Jamaicans overwhelmingly focus on class for explaining social inequality 
rather than skin color or race, despite my research revealing dramatic racial hierarchies in both 
wealth and educational attainment. 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Inequality in the Caribbean country of Jamaica is substantial. As measured through its 
Gini coefficient, the country reports a Gini index of 45.5 with approximately 20 percent of the 
population living below the poverty line (World Bank 2013). However, this inequality is solely 
attributed to class factors by state actors due to a combination of deep income stratification and 
perceived ethno-racial homogeneity - fully 91.6 percent self-identify as black (or black-mixed 
race), 6.2 percent self-identify as mixed-race, and the remaining 3 percent as Chinese, East 
Indian, white, or ‘other’ (World Bank 2013). Additionally, the nation views itself as the 
amalgamation of creolization1 both in its people2 and culture, as achieved through the nationalist 
ideology of Creole Multi-Racialism (Thame 2017), like tenets of mestizaje or racial mixing in 
Latin America.  
This ideology of mixing cultural forms, accompanied by the belief of extensive and 
prominent miscegenation, characterized the inhabitants of Jamaica as largely being of mixed-
racial ancestry has further coalesced into the national motto, “Out of many, one people.” This 
purports the belief that there is no racial distinction between the peoples of Jamaica, hence 
further supporting claims of racial equality. As Norman Manley, the first Vice Premier of the 
island who helped coined the motto states, “We have in Jamaica our own type of beauty, a 
wonderful mixture of African and European” (Manley 1939:109), “ [We] are made up of peoples 
drawn from all over the world, predominantly Negro or of mixed blood, but also with large 
numbers of others, and nowhere in the world has more progress been made in developing a non-
racial society in which also color is not psychologically significant” (Nettleford 1970:23-24). 
                                                          
1 A fusion of diverse cultures represented by the varying racial groups on the island which perfectly coalesced into a 
distinctive Jamaican culture that was neither European nor African (Braithwaite 1971). 
2 The word creole refers to a person of European and African ancestry - “a mixture or blending of various 
ingredients that originated in the Old worlds” (Bolland 1998:1-2) 
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Thus, the assumption is that inequality would not be structured along categorical race and/or skin 
color in such a society. 
In the U.S. it is not surprising that race would predict socioeconomic well-being 
(Carnevale and Strohl 2013; Conley 1999; Diamond 2006; Fryer, Pager, and Spenkuch 2013; 
Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Pager 2003). Additionally, colorism 
research shows that skin color shapes educational attainment (Hunter 2007; Keith and Herring 
1991; Monk 2014), health outcomes (Monk 2015), and job market outcomes (Allen, Telles, and 
Hunter 2000; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007). In Latin America, where ideologies of creolization 
are also concretized into nationhood, scholars have argued that such ideologies obfuscate and 
perpetuate racial discrimination (Bonilla-Silva and Glover 2005; Warren and Sue 2011; Winant 
1999) and have found that social inequality, encompassing education, income, health, and 
discrimination, is heavily structured along race and skin color (Andrews 2004, Canache, Hayes, 
Mondak, and Seligson 2014; Flores and Telles 2012; Gravlee and Dressler 2005; Monk 2016; 
Perreira and Telles 2014, Sue 2013, Telles 2004; Telles, Flores and Urrea-Giraldo 2015; Telles 
and Lim 1998; Villarreal 2010).  
Likewise, for the case of Jamaica, scholars have long contended the role of race/color in 
the nation (Brown-Glaude 2007; Charles 2003; 2009; Gordon 1991; Johnson 2004; Johnson 
2005; Kelly and Bailey 2018; Wallace 2010) and nation building, especially in that of Creole 
Multi-Racialism (Austin-Broos 1994; Cooper 2012; Meeks 2000; Thames 2017; Thomas 2002; 
2004). Given these scholarly assertions and the fact that all societies that have been colonized by 
European powers hold legacies of race-making ideology, how does socioeconomic well-being 
map onto measures of race and skin color in Jamaica; an Anglo-Caribbean nation in the 
Americas which like the U.S., was colonized by the British Crown, however, unlike the U.S., an 
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ideology of racial mixing is contiguous to some regions of Latin America? I first explore the 
interpretations and constructions of Jamaicanness in contemporary Jamaican society. I then 
investigate the influence of levels of nationalism on perceptions of racial and color 
discrimination as important explanations of black poverty. By providing an understanding of 
Jamaicans unique form of racial democracy and its connection to perception of the causes of 
poverty, offer a fuller picture of what racial and color inequality looks like in the majority Afro-
descent country.  
Distinction between Categorical Race and Skin Color 
While categorical race and skin color often overlap, they should not be conflated. Skin 
color and categorical race are analytically separate and can have different relationships with 
inequality, and so we need to examine them separately. Race has no basis in biology and 
represents a social, political, and economic constructed image of humankind (Omi and Winant 
2014) who’s meaning varies across context and time (Banton 2012; see also Bailey, Loveman, 
Muniz, 2013; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Hirschman 2004; Loveman 1999; Monk 2013; 
20143). U.S. racial classifications are pan-categories that remove skin color differences between 
individuals and group them as a collective based on ancestry, language, religion, and/or 
geographical location (Dixon and Telles 2017).  For example, not all individuals racialized as 
‘black’ are dark-skinned (especially given use of hyperdescent in the U.S.) nor is someone of 
dark skin from Southeast Asia racially classified as ‘black’, even if they have darker skin than 
someone labelled as African American in the U.S. The context provided by literature in the U.S. 
has skin color generally conceptualized as gradients along a color continuum subject to racial 
                                                          
3 For more on the contextually of race see also: Bailey, Fialho, and Penner 2016; Bailey, Saperstein, and Penner 
2014; Campbell, Bratter, Roth 2016; Johnson 2004; Monk 2016; Roth 2016; Saperstein 2008; 2012; Saperstein and 
Penner 2012.  
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categories. As such, racial categories tend to be explicitly defined, so that color is only 
analytically utilized to differentiate members within the same racial category4.   
Furthermore, studies that examine skin color and racial self-classification as predictors of 
outcomes of inequality usually find multifaceted relations between the two (Bailey, Fialho, and 
Penner 2016; Bailey et al. 2014; Telles 2004, 2014; Telles et al. 2015; Telles and Lim 1998). For 
example, Bailey and colleagues (2014) in their analysis of household income inequality, using 
both racial self-identification and perceived skin color in Latin America and the U.S., found that 
income inequality can best be understood in some countries using either measures or both. In 
their analysis, both skin color and self-identified race significantly explained variations in 
household income for some countries including the U.S. However, in countries such as Brazil, 
Panama, and Costa Rica, racial identification better accounted for inequality. Conversely, they 
found that for countries like Colombia and Uruguay variation in household income was better 
explained by differences in skin color alone (Bailey et al. 2014). Moreover, some studies have 
shown skin color to be a stronger predictor of inequality than categorical race (see Monk 2016; 
Paredes 2018). Thus, while both categorical race and skin color are assigned characteristics, the 
two may not be easily interchangeable or equally efficient in capturing inequality structured by 
phenotype (Bailey et al. 2016). 
Race and Skin Color in Jamaica 
Race and skin color have shaped relation of power, status, and identity on the island of 
Jamaica from its colonial era (detailed in chapter 1) and continue to do so present day. Studies 
that have examined race and color in Jamaica do so through its interaction with class and cite 
                                                          
4 For example, there have been numerous studies on the intra-group difference between African Americans (Allen, 
Telles and Hunter 2000; Bowman, Muhammad and Ifatunji 2004; Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity 2006; Hughes 
and Hertel 1990; Johnson, Farrell and Stoloff 1998; Keith and Herring 1991; Monk 2014; Seltzer and Smith 1991), 
Asians (Ryabov 2016), whites (Hannon 2015), and Latinos (Allen, Telles, and Hunter 2000; Hunter 2007; Roth 
2010). 
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several ways in which inequality manifest as a result of these. Douglass (1992) in her 
ethnographical analysis of the relationship between structure and practice of power, juxtaposes a 
naturalized hierarchy of race (introduced as a “color hierarchy”) to beliefs in "meritocracy" and 
"egalitarianism" which manifests in a group of (white) elite families which remain largely color 
and class endogamous over the several generations (see also Austin-Broos 1994). Additionally, 
Gordon (1991), in his work on educational outcomes, found that despite improvements in the 
position of darker-skinned, lower-class children in relation to their lighter-skinned counterparts, 
lighter-skin children still outperform them. More recently, Kelly and Bailey (2018), using the 
2001 Jamaican census, reported that of the population aged 25-65, 40.7% of white Jamaicans had 
completed university level education compared to only 2.4% of Afro-Jamaicans. Chinese, East 
Indian, and mixed-race Jamaicans also had much lower percentages of college completion than 
whites, though significantly higher than Afro-Jamaicans.  
Even with some recognition of both covert and overt racial tension in contemporary 
Jamaica, the privilege associated with lighter skin color is still widely embraced and sought after 
as evidenced by the skin-bleaching epidemic in Jamaica (Charles 2003, 2009; Johnson 2004).  It 
is embedded in colorism: the notion that lighter or being closer to whiteness is better (Bonilla-
Silva and Dietrich 2008; Harris 2008; Hannon 2015; Kinsbrunner 1996; Sue 2009; Telles 2004). 
Individuals who engage in practices of skin bleaching or lightening are mostly portrayed in 
popular media and documentaries as from working-class backgrounds, and the most common 
explanation given by these individuals is that being of a lighter skin color offers better life-
chances and/or preferential treatment (Blay 2011; Brown-Glaude 2007; Charles 2003, 2009; 
Wallace 2010). However, skin-bleaching is often framed as pathology: a form of mental illness 
or the manifestation of self-hate (Brown-Glaude 2007; Charles 2003, 2009). This framing 
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effectively delegitimizes overarching claims that there are privileges and advantages associated 
with lighter skin in Jamaican society (Wallace 2010).  In addition, skin-bleaching is framed 
exclusively as a class struggle, which is used to support the idea that Jamaica is free of racial 
problems (Henke 2001). In sum, there is little doubt that race and skin color continue to stratify 
contemporary Jamaica. 
 
DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
The context of Jamaica’s racial dynamics is generally understood from the class-
dominant ideological perspective of racial mixing (or creolization), at least in official or elite 
discourse, thus viewed as non-racial by virtue of its racial homogeneity. This believed non-racial 
framing operates on the island in the form of loose racial categorizations and colloquial skin 
color designations.  Additionally, there has been little quantitative research on racial inequality in 
Jamaica. Considering these factors, I first contend that Jamaican nationalism, while purported to 
be nonracial, was and is raced. From this position, using the Americas Barometer social survey on 
Jamaica (a comprehensive and nationally representative dataset), the census, and original, qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews, I examine I then ask three central questions: (1) what is the role of race 
in contemporary constructions and interpretations of Jamaican nationhood, (2) how does 
Jamaican nationalism influence perceptions of racial and color prejudice and discrimination, and (3) how 
is socioeconomic well-being structured along categorical race and skin color in such a context? 
Thus, my dissertation analyzes racial and skin color stratification in Jamaica, the impact of an 
ideology of racial mixing on Jamaican explanation for that inequality, and racial and nation-
based identification. 
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My dissertation engages with and builds upon theories of group conflict and hybridity5 
which holds that in contexts where there exists embedded racial hierarchy, this should 
theoretically provoke either significant race-based mobilization or a generalized denial of racial 
discrimination among the minority racial population. This dominant perspective attributes that 
denial to entrenched ideologies of mestizaje or racial democracy that obfuscates the structural 
causes of ethno-racial inequality. These ideologies are alternatively conceptualized as ‘color 
blindness’, ‘race-blindness’ and ‘false consciousness’. Researchers assert that across Latin 
America non-whites lack understanding of how race operates in both historical and 
contemporary forms and its correlation to the labor market, educational opportunities, and so 
forth. While cognizant of challenges to this group conflict perspective, given that it is a dominant 
approach, I use it to explore the Jamaican context. 
Many scholars have looked to Latin America and the Spanish speaking Caribbean to test 
this theory and examine the effects of the ideology of racial mixing or ethnic fusion. While there 
is evidence to support both sides of the debate on the effects of such an ideology on a 
population’s propensity to deny racial discrimination, the effects of this ideology have not been 
analyzed in Anglo-Caribbean countries. As robust generalizable studies of social stratification by 
skin color and/or categorical race are generally lacking with regards to the Anglo-Caribbean. The 
case of Jamaica is theoretically important particularly because it is an English-speaking society 
in the Caribbean, which like the U.S., was colonized by the British Crown. However, unlike the 
U.S., an ideology of racial mixing is salient, similar to some regions of Latin America.  
Additionally, Jamaica is an overwhelmingly Afro-descent population, hence, overt 
privileging of non-black ancestry is constrained, and a color hierarchy is not always explicitly 
visible. Unique characteristics in those setting may influence the application and role of 
                                                          
5 Referred to as creolization, racial mixing, and racial democracy; I use the terms interchangeable throughout.  
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ideologies of racial mixing in issues of colorism or race-based inequality. Thus, considering the 
colonial past and diffused ideologies of racial fusion, I investigate how Jamaica’s unique 
iteration of an ideology of racial mixing affects the likelihood that Jamaicans recognize racial 
prejudice and discrimination. My work makes use of categorical race and skin color, analyzed as 
two distinct dimensions of the construct we call “race.” A more nuanced examination of racial 
inequality is provided from the use of both measures. Additionally, it highlights the 
heterogeneity within a majority Afro-descent population, oftentimes treated as a monolith. 
Furthermore, it challenges the non-racial frame and rhetoric dominant in Jamaica, the region at 
large, and U.S. conceptualizations of race. 
My dissertation utilizes mixed methods; two of my chapters are solely quantitative in 
nature. They use data from the 2001 Jamaican Census, a 10% sample accessible at IPUMS-
International (Minnesota Population Center 2015), and the 2008 and 2014 waves of the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) on Jamaica, also known as the Americas Barometer 
social survey (Americas Barometer 2010; 2012; 2014). I have written the three substantive 
chapters as stand-alone papers. Thus, I repeat some of the descriptions of the data and methods 
as well some of my argumentation. Additionally, I use original, qualitative, in-depth semi-
structured interviews of 25 Jamaican citizens.  
Chapter One, “Jamaica: The Historical Context and the Construction of Nationhood”, 
provides a historical background of Jamaica. In this chapter, I first detail the beginning of each 
racial group on the island. I then highlight the role of race in structuring not only power and 
status, but also national identity. Lastly, I discuss the ways in which race and color maintained as 
an orienting factor in Jamaican society while being presented as nonracial, thus, motivating my 
research questions.  
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Chapter Two, “The Raced Nature of Nationhood: The Centering of Hybridity in 
Contemporary Interpretations of Jamaican Nationhood,” uses original qualitative, semi-
structured interviews to examine the influences nationalist frame of Creole Multi-Racialism and 
its accompanying ideology of Jamaican Exceptionalism on conceptions of nationhood in 
contemporary Jamaican society. Given the complex history of Jamaica discussed in the previous 
chapter, I explore what defines Jamaican nationalism and how race treated in the construction of 
group boundaries in contemporary Jamaica. Thus, in this chapter, I examine: (1) the parameters 
of Jamaican national identity and (2) the dynamics of race relations on the island. I argue that 
interpretation of contemporary nationalism still obscures the conflation of race and class while 
all the while elevating brownness or hybridity as the quintessential to nationhood. 
 In Chapter Three, “Racial Inequality and the Recognition of Racial Discrimination in 
Jamaica,” I: (1) examine the extent of Jamaica’s contemporary racial inequality using national 
census data; (2) use nationally representative data from the 2008 Americas Barometer social 
survey to determine the extent to which a recognition of racial discrimination characterizes 
Jamaican public opinion; (3) explore the salience of an ideology of racial mixing in Jamaica; and 
(4) test whether that ideology affects the likelihood that Jamaicans acknowledge contemporary 
racial discrimination. The chapter’s findings document dramatic social inequality by skin color 
in Jamaica and suggest that a majority embrace an ideology that racial mixing is negatively 
associated with Jamaicans’ recognition of racial discrimination.   
Chapter Four, “Race, Skin Color, and Social Inequality in Jamaica”, investigates how 
social inequalities are structured along racial and color lines in Jamaica. Using data from the 
2010-14 Americas Barometer social survey, as well as 2001 census data on Jamaica, I investigate 
the effects of categorical race and skin color on socioeconomic well-being: availability of basic 
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household amenities (BHA), household crowdedness, per capita household income, and 
educational attainment. Results show that socioeconomic well-being across all dimensions is 
starkly structured along race and skin color lines.  
Chapter Five concludes the dissertation with a summary of the main findings, 
implications, and directions for future research. I contend that my dissertation thus makes 
important advances in our understanding of racial dynamics in patterning overall socioeconomic 
well-being and the variation of the utility of both race and skin color across contexts. It also 
complicates race inequality discourse by highlighting the heterogeneity within the black diaspora 
as it moves beyond common sense notions of race. It also illustrates how the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses to interrogate the complexities of race can leverage 
important insights. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Jamaica: The Historical Context and the Construction of Nationhood 
Jamaica is marked by an extensive history of population movement, including ethno-
racial admixture, from the colonial period forward.  What is more, common-sense beliefs about 
the extent, meaning, and results of that movement and admixture often coalesce around a myth 
of national origin of a people once divided, but now united, if not fused, in nation-based kinship 
(e.g., Braithwaite 1971).  A particularly illustrative example of the contemporary salience of this 
national origin myth is Jamaica’s nation-state motto: ‘Out of Many, One People.’  The motto is 
inscribed on the country’s coat of arms.  Like a visual menagerie of national belonging, the coat 
of arms is further adorned with figures of male and female members of the Taino (Arawak) tribe 
and a Jamaican crocodile mounted on the royal helmet of the British Monarchy.6 This symbol 
dates to long before Jamaica became independent within the British Commonwealth in 1962; 
Jamaica was granted its coat of arms under Royal Warrant in 1661, designed by William 
Sancroft, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury.   
 
THE HISTORY OF RACIAL GROUPS IN JAMAICA 
Conquest and Indigenous Annihilation 
Despite romanticized myths of national origin and their potential to mine certain social 
boundaries in order to fuse diverse populations for nation-based kinship, historical records often 
contain disenchanting realities that challenge those narratives.  Like so many other countries in 
the Caribbean, the Jamaican island territory was ‘discovered’ by Christopher Columbus in 1494.  
At that time, it was primarily inhabited by the Arawak, indigenous to the island for at least a 
millennium before Columbus’ arrival.  Acting on behalf of the Spanish Crown, who had 
                                                          
6 http://jis.gov.jm/symbols/jamaican-coat-of-arms/ (accessed on 9-10-2016) 
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commissioned Columbus’ voyage, the invading forces occupied the island using superior 
weaponry and advanced war strategies.  Those not killed by Spanish war dogs and crossbows 
during initial phases were enslaved.  In tandem with war violence, forced labor and imported 
disease soon annihilated the Arawak population. 
The African Slave Trade 
In response to the loss of labor, the Spaniards brought in African-origin, first from Spain, 
and later directly from West African ports. In fact, during the transatlantic trade era, the 
Caribbean was a regional market for slaves, and it is reported that approximately 11 million 
African slaves disembarked there between 1514 and 1866 (Voyages: Assessing the Slave Trade 
2008).  After a century and a half of Spanish occupation, the British Crown seized Jamaica in 
1655.  The new owners took possession of a population of 1,500 African slaves—human war 
booty—that it steadily grew for its island plantocracy to supply and enrich Europe.  According to 
Sio (1976), the average ratio of ‘slaves to whites’ from 1770 to 1820 was 10:1; by 1832, that 
ratio had nearly doubled (p. 6-7).  This was not a society with slaves; rather, it was a ‘slave 
society’ (Wacquant 2002) centered on profit extraction, mostly through the cultivation of sugar 
for export.  
The British Crown abolished chattel slavery in 1833.  British plantation owners, however, 
were reluctant to relinquish their mode of capital accumulation; thus, the African slave trade to 
its Jamaican colony continued until 1838.  The presence of free ‘negroes’ (henceforth free 
blacks) in the Jamaican colony, nonetheless, dates to much earlier times, perhaps to the very first 
years of colonization. For centuries, blacks with a free status were a very small population 
compared to that of enslaved blacks.  In addition to their status difference with black slaves, free 
blacks were also often distinguished from ‘free colored,’ the progeny of European and African 
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admixture.  In the 18th century, free coloreds outnumbered free blacks several times over; for 
example, Sio (1976) estimates that in the year 1793 there were 2,000 free blacks compared to 
8,000 free colored.  In fact, the free colored population began to outnumber whites in the 1820s, 
and in 1830 there were an estimated 36,000 free coloreds in Jamaica.   
The free colored population obtained that status either through birth right or 
manumission. To suggest that free coloreds were ‘free’ in the sense of equal in status and rights 
to whites, though, would be far from correct.  Free coloreds were granted not rights as such, but 
‘privileges’ (Sio 1976).  Importantly, they were not confined to, or very often worked on, 
plantations; instead, they worked for wages in various activities outside the plantations. They 
could also own property, including black slaves.      
In this system, degree of population admixture, often gauged through skin color variation, 
was closely tracked.  The 18th century classification scheme that sorted some of these degrees of 
admixture was as follows (Higman 1976; Sio 1976; James 1992): 
Negro:    child of negro and negro 
Sambo:   child of mulatto and negro 
Mulatto:   child of white and negro 
Quadroon:   child of white and mulatto 
Mustee:   child of white and quadroon 
Mustifino:   child of white and mustee 
Quintroon:   child of white and mustifino 
Octoroon:   child of white and quintroon 
These distinctions played a role in sorting status at birth: 
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‘After 1733, those lighter than mustee were legally defined as white on the 
principle of generation and received the full rights of citizenship.  Those darker 
than mustifino were defined in the law as mulatto. Legally, then, after 1733 the 
status of free coloured in Jamaica applied to those in the category mulatto.  The 
free coloured group was also divided into free browns (mustee, quadroon, 
mulatto) and free blacks (sambo and negro)’ (Sio 1976:8).  
Hence, skin color as a proxy for degree of admixture held great importance in Jamaica for 
centuries.  Special privileges, such as free colored status, as well as the actual possibility of being 
legally defined as white, meant that the lighter a Jamaican’s skin color, the greater that 
individual’s rights and privileges.  Unlike in the U.S. where ‘one-drop rule’ ideation and 
segregation became pervasive and was inscribed in law, in Jamaica ‘miscegenation and 
concubinage were practiced and accepted’ and produced clear advantages along a color scale 
(Sio, 1976:17). 
Restrictive laws against free coloreds, or de jure discrimination, were lifted in 1830.  This 
change was not due to any sense of inherent rights finally granted them by whites, but to the 
need to ensure the loyalty of this population for service in the militia, especially against the 
Marrons (or ‘runaway slave’ populations). By 1828, free coloreds were 54 percent of the total 
militia force in Jamaica.  Although it was surely much better to be a free colored than a black 
slave, actual upward mobility for that population category was not a norm by any means.  Of the 
estimated 18,800 free coloreds in Jamaica in 1826, one report classified them thusly: 400 ‘rich,’ 
5,500 ‘in fair circumstances,’ and 22,000 as ‘absolutely poor’ (Sio 1976). 
Caste systems (socially ascribed status) in the Caribbean and Latin America were loose 
enough to provide some social mobility between the groups, but not to most dark-skinned 
15 
 
Africans (Hellwig 1992). In fact, what allowed planters to continually dominate their non-white 
counterparts was the social creation of ‘mulattos’ in the Caribbean and Latin America which 
served to strengthen slave societies. Children resulting from recurrent sexual assaults and 
concubinage, with white planters, were listed as ‘colored’ or ‘brown’ and were often further 
categorized into quadroon, mestee, and other groupings (Higman 1976; James 1992; Sio 1976; 
Ward 1988). These off-springs compared to ‘un-mixed’ Africans had a chance at being treated 
better. While never equal to their white counterparts; ‘free coloreds’ held substantially more 
power and rights compared to black Jamaicans (free or otherwise). Thus, this controlling and 
organizing mechanism of skin color, used by whites, became an important ‘escape route’ from 
slavery for many Africans (Degler 1971).  
Most of these privileges were granted based on skin color and this, often regarded as a 
representation of the degree of population admixture, was closely tracked in Jamaica (Higman 
1976; James 1992; Sio 1976). Skin color played a pivotal role in the rights, privileges, and 
advantages one was granted (Sio 1976) because it was used to perceive, categorize, and rank 
others. This played a significant role in determining status at birth; which included being legally 
classified as white or free. Even though ‘free coloreds’ sometimes resisted alongside fellow 
Africans, they more frequently aided whites in the subjugation of blacks by sustaining the 
oppressive system of slavery (Johnson 2004). For example, Sio (1976) notes that in 1830 many 
restrictive laws against ‘free coloreds’ were lifted to ensure their loyalty to whites. This was done 
by offering a place to ‘free coloreds’ via serving in the militia, especially against the Maroons 
(the ‘free’ or ‘runaway slave’ population). While their position was better than that of black 
slaves, social mobility was rare until most whites left Jamaican society and previously ‘white-
only’ jobs became available to them. This was then frequently used to further distance 
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themselves from other blacks and “lightness, valued as a promise of higher status, became 
valued for itself…” (Broom 1954:117). 
 Overall, at least three factors are central for understanding 16th to 19th century Jamaican 
society in terms of distinctions among Africans and their Jamaican-born descendants:  status, 
strata, and color.  Most blacks were slaves, and most free coloreds were poor and restricted both 
officially and unofficially. Nonetheless, there was a middle stratum that over the years replaced 
some lower- and middle-class whites in various previously white-only occupations.  This stratum 
was the ‘rising colored urban class’ (Sio 1976:14).  Lastly, there also existed a small upper 
stratum of free colored, many of whom had accumulated wealth through properties or 
inheritance.  Legacies of that system of status, strata, and color remain today, as will be 
addressed further below.   
Indian Immigrants 
After the abolition of slavery in the English-speaking Caribbean in 1834, many blacks 
moved en masse as far away as possible from the plantations, the most enduring reminders of 
their former bondage.  In search of alternate sources of exploitable labor, the colonial 
government set its sights on India and China.  Between 1845 and 1914, about 36,000 East 
Indians were brought to Jamaica under an indentureship program agreed upon by British colonial 
governments of Jamaica and India (Vertovik 1995).  Despite difficulties, including language 
differences, religious contrasts, segregation, discrimination, and deplorable living conditions, 
East Indians in Jamaica eventually formed a permanent community on the island (Sherlock and 
Bennet 1998). Additionally, as a measure to prevent East Indians and Africans from uniting in 
resistance against exploitation, the colonial state deliberately enforced policies to segregate 
Indians from Afro-Jamaicans, exacerbating animosity between the two populations (Sherlock 
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and Bennett 1998).  On one side, Afro-Jamaicans resented Indians who succeeded and threatened 
their place in the economy, and on the other, Indian-Jamaicans’ heritage involved a fixed caste 
system in which skin pigmentation partly determined social status, a fact that contributed to 
viewing the darker-skinned Afro-Jamaicans as socially inferior (Sherlock and Bennett 1998). 
Chinese Immigrants 
 After the abolition of slavery went into full effect in 1838, a dilemma presented itself to 
Jamaica’s plantation owners. With the former slaves largely disinclined to remain as plantation 
workers, they were left without a workforce (Bryan 2004; Ho 1989; Lind 1958). Rather than find 
some means of enticing workers back to their plantations, the response was to “import” labor 
from various countries. Anticipating the need for a diversified and free labor force, a Committee 
of the British House of Commons prepared a report in 1811 deeming the Chinese as prime 
candidates for recruitment. Lind quotes the report as stating that “the Chinese emigrants have 
uniformly conducted themselves with the greatest propriety and order and have been peculiarly 
instrumental in promoting the improvement of those countries to which they have emigrated” 
(Lind 1958:146). With this endorsement, the Chinese were among the peoples recruited as 
indentured servants to the West Indies after the abolition of slavery. Between the years of 1854 
and 1886, just fewer than two thousand Chinese would make their way to the island in varying 
shipments (Bryan 2004). This would set Chinese migrants up as the face of opposition to Afro-
Jamaican noncompliance to British rule, both literally and figuratively. 
However, upon arrival, the realities of their indenture would drastically erode the initial 
anticipation of their promise as workers. These first arrived via Panama in 1854, where they had 
been recruited to help construct railroads. Almost 500 Chinese laborers, who were said to be 
faring badly under the harsh conditions in Panama, were exchanged for Indian-Jamaican labor.  
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From the arduous journey to diminished health from previous work in other British Colonial 
enterprises (such as the construction of railroads in Panama), much of this workforce would be 
lost or infirm before arrival. The profuse violation of their contracts, from discrepancies in pay to 
withholding of promised healthcare, lead to violent protests by Chinese workers. Bryan (2004) 
states that “the prejudiced response of the local Jamaican authorities to the determination of the 
Chinese to protect their interests was that they were ‘recalcitrant’, ‘turbulent’, ‘vindictive in 
temper’, and ‘crafty’” (p. 15). The general displeasure of these workers with their circumstances 
would lead to several desertions from estates and combined with deaths, this would lead to the 
population of Chinese in Jamaica dwindling to 481 by 1891 (Lind 1958:148). The remaining 
Chinese migrants would be characterized as left to “vagrancy, begging, and threats of 
imprisonment” (Bryan 2004:15).  
The next significant period of Chinese migration to Jamaica would be between 1900 to 
the 1940s, with 6,886 Chinese migrants recorded in the 1943 census—with the climax of this 
migration in the 1920s. Bryan (2004) notes that “the colonial authorities also favored the 
immigration of Chinese females in order to reduce the levels of concubinage between Chinese 
males and 'native' Jamaican females that had produced 5,508 Chinese colored by 1943 (2,928 of 
them female)” (p. 16). This new wave of immigrants would primarily be entrepreneurial with “64 
percent of Chinese men and 50.4 percent of Chinese women involved in trade” and only 32 of the 
6,886 were laborers (Bryan 2004:16). They were so successful in this economic arena that by 
1910, ‘grocery store’ and ‘Chinese shop’ had become synonymous serving the overwhelmingly 
black lower classes (Bohr 2004; Bryan 2004; Ho 1989; Johnson 1983; Lee-Loy 2015; Levy 
1986; Lind 1958; Shibata 2005; Tsang 2015). This success provoked resentment from other 
ethno-racial populations. Chinese-Jamaican reactions to official and unofficial discrimination 
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contributed to the construction of parallel Chinese-Jamaican institutions, such as mutual benefit 
associations and ‘weechen’ (rotating credit association originating in China). Partly through 
these reactive processes, the Jamaican Chinese could sustain a robust community despite their 
relatively small numbers (Yin 1963). 
It is during this period of upward social mobility that two out of the three major anti-
Chinese riots in Jamaica would occur. Johnson (1983) notes that, “in the early years of the 
twentieth century complaints began to appear in the press that the Chinese shopkeeper was 
displacing his Creole competitor” (p. 55). Coupled with the international recoil over the Boxer 
Rebellion between 1899 and 1901, Jamaican society leaned quite readily into the “Yellow Peril” 
narrative with increasing vigor (Lind 1958; Lee-Loy 2015). Regardless of their nation of birth, 
the Chinese population on the island would frequently be referred to in terms of ‘the alien 
problem’ by journalists of the time (Lee-Loy 2015:149).  
Immigration policy would react in kind. Beginning in 1905 with the Alien Act, 
registration and references to character were necessary to gain entry into Jamaica (Tsang 2015) 
and by 1911 (when most parishes featured several Chinese owned shops) a deposit of thirty 
pounds sterling and the passing of an oral language test would also be required (Lee-Loy 2015). 
This rhetoric would spur on a 1917 motion by Gordon Tennant of the St. Ann’s Parish Board 
requesting that ‘native’ shopkeepers and the community-at-large should be protected from what 
he deemed to be innateness for manipulative business practices, which was in-line with the 
widely held stereotype that the Chinese were single-minded in their avariciousness. They were 
perceived as a threat to the moral interests of the island—a sentiment furthered by the perceived 
lack of contribution the Chinese community in Jamaica offered to the British cause during the 
First World War. Tennant’s proposed remedy involved the further restriction of Chinese entry to 
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the island by the colonial government. This sparked debate throughout the island, which was 
largely favorable towards such discriminatory entry practices (Lee-Loy 2015:151).  
Though the motion would ultimately fail to sustain momentum, this increasing public 
antipathy would be further illustrated by rising acts of aggression, such as the increased burglary 
and assault of Chinese shopkeepers.  By July 1918, the first major organized riot targeting 
Chinese owned shops commenced. Starting with a personal altercation between a Chinese shop 
owner and a ‘creole’ police officer in the town of Ewarton, it would end with bands of hundreds 
of mainly working-class Afro-Jamaican mobs targeting, looting, and burning Chinese-owned 
businesses, and stoning dozens of Chinese people across the entire island (Johnson 1983:50-51).  
By 1919, further restrictions on Chinese migration would be established with the 
Immigration Restriction Law, which also required certification for all Chinese people leaving 
Jamaica with the intent of returning (Lee-Loy 2015). Still, in 1925, Chinese people held 28 
percent of trade licenses issued in Jamaica, despite their proportionately smaller number (Bryan 
2004; Lee-Loy 2015). This incurred a 1925 Passport Bill requiring strict visa requirement 
specifically for entering Chinese (Lee-Loy 2015), which further targeted this group based on 
stereotypes of their perceived business practices: 
[T]he Chinese in Jamaica were accused of engaging in unfair practices, like adulterating 
goods, using unfair scales, and breaking labor laws that pertained to how long shops could be 
open, for example, or which items could be sold in various establishments. One observer 
suggested that the Chinese worked sixteen hours a day, often illegally, while other Jamaican 
shopkeepers who followed the law were able to keep their shops open for only eight hours. It 
was also argued that the Chinese were willing to live lifestyles that other Jamaicans would or 
could not in the pursuit of making money, such as living in the back of their shops instead of 
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maintaining a separate household and working extremely long hours. One member of the 
Jamaican Legislative Council actually called for a law that would make it illegal for individuals 
to sleep on the premises of their shops in an attempt to level the economic field of competition 
between Chinese and native Jamaican shopkeepers by forcing the Chinese to incur the expense 
of supporting a separate household (Lee-Loy 2015:147-148). 
By the 1930s, a Native Defender Committee was formed with the intent of promoting and 
defending “the interests of Jamaicans, politically, educationally, commercially, socially, morally 
and legally,” as quoted by Lee-Loy (2015:152) from the NDC’s mandate. The subject of this 
promotion and defense would be ‘native’ Jamaicans. It should be noted that this movement, 
much like all the other grass-roots, anti-Chinese movements on the island was extremely short-
lived, belying a general ambivalence to committing to eliminating this perceived threat. This 
contention during this specific era is due to resentment towards a perceived prosperous yet 
legislatively vulnerable demographic during the Great Depression (Bryan 2004).     
Although, the restriction of Chinese movement would prove to be more firm with the 
achievement of the  
“1935 Passport Law, which established stiff visa requirements for entry into Jamaica 
and the 1933 Law to Regulate the Admission in to and Deportation from Jamaica of 
Aliens, which set out conditions, such as declaring bankruptcy or being convicted of 
gambling, under which individuals could be deported from Jamaica” (Lee-Loy 
2015:153).  
These laws were noted in their singular attention to Chinese migrants by the local Chinese 
Benevolent Society.  
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Concurrently, during the 20th century was is a time where various black nationalist and 
labor movements subverted colonial power. Chinese non-participation in this stoked Afro-
Jamaican resentment of their social mobility. Despite concessions to language and religion 
forced upon them by colonial expectation, the Chinese remained insular. As they were 
predominantly Hakka Chinese, it was relatively simple for them to form societies and 
connections based on shared ethnic background. Through various societies and schools (when 
they did not send their children to be educated in China), they managed to either insulate 
themselves or only move in predominately non-black elite circles. This non-participation in the 
black labor movement led them to be the targets of another Anti-Chinese riot in 1938 during a 
much larger labor strike (Bohr 2004; Bryan 2004; Lee-Loy 2015; Lind 1958). By 1940, all alien 
Chinese would be banned from entering the island until 1956 (Lee-Loy 2015).   
By the time renewed Chinese migration would commence in the 1980’s and 90’s, there 
was an acceptance of the Chinese as an entrepreneurial class. New migrants fleeing the hostile 
political climate of both mainland China and Hong Kong would find no public unrest at their 
arrival. If anything, there was a distance established by established Jamaican Chinese based on 
their confirmed space in the Jamaican class hegemony (Tsang 2015). There was, for this period, 
no market for any organized Anti-Chinese sentiment. 
Populations from the Middle East 
Lastly, populations from the Middle East also form part of the Jamaican ethno-racial 
landscape. A Jewish presence began in the Spanish colonial era through indentured servitude in 
the sugar industry.  Despite initial discrimination, the Jewish population made phenomenal 
progress, moving from plantations into commerce. As prosperous merchants, Jewish-Jamaicans 
came to occupy important positions and status in the Jamaican economy; their upward mobility 
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put them on par with the privileged planter class known to seek financial help from Jewish 
enterprises (Johnson 2005). Others from the Middle East—Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians—
followed similar economic paths, moving from peddlers to merchants and traders (Nicholls 
1986). 
 
ETHNO-RACIAL UNITY OR DIVISION  
How did this patchwork of ethno-racial populations fuse into a collective Jamaican 
identity, if indeed it did?  That is, how did the high boundaries of ethno-racial populations 
cemented in conquest, slavery, labor migration, skin color, status, and stratum possibly give way 
to common kinship as Jamaicans?  Scholarship on this question goes in several directions.  
Kinship through Nation 
A popular lens on ethno-racial population formation in Jamaican history was provided by 
historian Edward Braithwaite (1971).  He advanced a thesis of Creoledom to suggest the gradual 
formation of a unifying nation-based identification beyond ethno-racial particularisms.  
Creolization, in its simplest sense, suggests a mixing of diverse peoples that he posits intensified 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries with the arrival of non-white and non-black labor migrants.  
Through admixture (specifically the fusion of diverse cultures), Braithwaite (1971) asserted that 
a Creole society that was neither European nor African emerged, providing black, white, and 
colored inhabitants a sense of being distinctly Jamaican.  
In the 1930’s, though, Jamaica, still as Crown Colony, experienced widespread 
discontent and social unrest that deeply threatened its tenuous social fabric. On the class front, 
the unemployment rates of the working-class were high and living conditions continually 
plummeted. In terms of skin color dynamics, for example, banks and stores (generally owned by 
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non-blacks) hired mostly only light-complexioned staff to positions that involved face-to-face 
interaction with customers. To counter these trends and conflicts, social movements arose 
throughout the island, predominantly led by educated and wealthy ‘mixed-race’ elites.  Perhaps 
most notable among them were Norman Manley (first Vice Premier), Alexander Bustamante 
(who became the undisputed champion of the working-class) and Michael Manley (of socialist 
orientation). Bustamante and Norman Manley, cousins, later went on to organize the two 
principal political parties that came to dominate politics in post-independence Jamaica: the 
Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP), respectively. Both political 
parties acted as brokers to establish multi-class coalitions to address the interests of divergent 
social strata on the island (Payne 1988).  
Creole Multiracial Nationalism. Among the many nationalist frames that emerged in 
Jamaica throughout the 20th century (Levi 1992), Creole Multi-Racialism largely dominated 
political discourse. This nationalist frame emphasized a form of cultural identity that would 
legitimate the nation as separate and distinct from the British. As the word ‘creole’ refers to a 
person of European and African ancestry, it signaled the aspired to identity of the nation. One 
way in which this creolization9 was purported to be accomplished was through the fusion of 
cultural practices by black Jamaicans (Thomas 2002), as well as those by other ethnic groups on 
the island. Hence, this established a distinct culture (Braithwaite 1971; see also Bolland 1998) in 
which all Jamaicans, despite racial differences, could participate.  
This ideology of creolization was not just conveyed via mixing cultural forms, but also 
through the belief of extensive and prominent miscegenation. As a result, the inhabitants of 
Jamaica were purported to be largely of mixed-racial ancestry, specifically that of European and 
African. Particularly as those advocating a Creole Multi-Racial identity were predominantly 
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wealthy, educated, ‘mixed-race’ elites, their mixed racial ancestry was flagged as the 
culmination and evidence of Jamaica’s unique creolized culture. This ‘accomplishment’ was 
further showcased by the national motto, “Out of many, one people,” which Norman Manley, the 
first Vice Premier (1955-62), helped to coin. Manley, himself mixed-race, emphasized racial and 
class unity through his national campaign, despite he himself representing the new brown elite 
who were separated from the majority black population, not just in color and claims to mixed-
race ancestry, but through prestigious education in Jamaica and England (Levi 1992).These 
claims to the Old World, especially European ancestry, in the conception of the nation, was 
critical as it was only through some claims to whiteness or Europe that the country could retain 
any claims to civility in a global context (Thame 2017); “We have in Jamaica our own type of 
beauty, a wonderful mixture of African and European” (Nettleford and Manley 1971).   
This profession of racial mixedness or hybridity as the desired and represented imagine 
of Jamaica, elevated brownness as an authentic claim to nationhood. While the assertion of a 
new ‘brown’ race10 (via Creole Multi-racialism), presented in some respects as non-racial as both 
African and European ancestry were essential. Especially as dominant European culture was 
being subverted in some ways; as Manley states, “we are not English, and we should never want 
to be” (Nettleford and Manley 1971). The nationalist frame of Creole Multiracialism then 
provided a space for the hybrid body as a political object that is neither colonizer nor the other 
(Thame 2017). Thus, the presence of a colonial authority is made immediately less visible. 
However, scholars have long contended the role of race in nation building via Creole 
Multi-Racialism. Meeks (2000) argues that leaders tended to define the goals of social 
movements as national, classed, and social, while those of the people were invariably raced. 
Austin-Broos (1994) and Thomas (2004) explain that nationalist efforts created a Jamaican 
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identity resembling classical European nationalism, founded on notions of a common history and 
culture rather than race, thus obscuring the conflation of class with race. Thomas (2002) further 
argues that this "Out of Many, one People" ideology “deflected active relationships to 
contemporary struggles in Africa and contained the development of other mobilizing ideologies 
along class or racial lines within the nationalist movement” (p. 515). While Thame (2017) 
contends that the meanings of Jamaicanness asserted by Creole Multi-Racial Nationalism were 
raced by deploying hybridity or brownness as a uniting force which defined Jamaica as a place 
for a hybrid culture and body. I posit that this belief of hybridity fostered the belief that most 
Jamaicans share commonalities in ‘blackness,’ whether through racial ancestry or culture. Thus, 
the project of Jamaica’s elites to form a Creole Multi-racial society under the motto “Out of 
many, one people,” is re-appropriated to mean “Out of many, one (black) people” (Thomas 
2004:1). This “one (black) people,” however, I argue can be understood as blackness essential to 
creolization - via mixed racial ancestry or culture, not blackness as it relates to political ideology 
and identity. 
Jamaican Exceptionalism. In opposition to this ideal of creolization, there were also 
other forms of nationalism that empowered blackness (Levi 1992), however, nationalist frames 
that had explicit black racial ideological narratives were framed as divisive and disparaged by 
state elites (Hamilton 1978; Johnson 2005; Nettleford 1965, 1970). As Norman Manley stated in 
a national address that such racial empowerment narratives are “fertile field for sowing ideas that 
do not belong to us, and for using powerful and good emotions that cling to the idea of Black 
Power for purposes that mean nothing to us” and “an attempt to dominate whites, divide and 
segregate the nation” (Manely 1939:381). Black Nationalist movements were not just framed as 
divisive but there was governmental action to suppression such movements in the island. For 
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examples, in 1963, then Prime Minister Alexandra Bustamante orchestrated the “Coral Gardens 
Incident” in which Rastafarians were rounded up and killed (Campbell and Vallette 2014). Thus, 
all explicit discussions of race, black pride were framed as divisive and effectively suppressed 
(Brown-Glaude 2007). Consequently, Jamaica was framed as non-racial (Vickerman 1999) all 
while making brownness or hybridity the center of not only identity, but for racial discourse and 
power (Thame 2017). 
I argue that one way in which this discrepancy between hybrid identification and non-
racialism by leaders, and the desire of the people for a national identity that fully included 
blackness and the black body, was through the ideology of Jamaican Exceptionalism, a narrative 
that uplifted blacks without being explicitly racial, as Gray (1991) states, it was an; 
“ideology [that] sought to purge the antagonistic elements from the ideology of 
the urban unemployment by hailing the subordinate classes as exemplary racial 
neuters in a world torn by ethnic disorder and strife. The appeal to the 
overwhelming black population was they were a special people in the world, who 
lived harmoniously with other domestic ethnic groups” (p. 82). 
The framing of the predominantly black underclass as “racial neuters” (Gray 1991) 
denotes that the nation’s black population are incapable of seeing race or racial differences 
between themselves or others, thus being effectively color-blind. As Vickerman (1999) explains, 
this ideology of Jamaican Exceptionalism supported the idea of Jamaica as “a multiracial society 
in which a variety of groups coexist so amicably that the society is effectively non-racial”11 (p. 
37).  
Along with this movement in the political sphere, in the social arena, non-racial framing 
was further illustrated in the ambiguity of racial classification and the use of skin color epithets 
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reflective of Jamaicans’ understandings of race. This ambiguity of racial classification and the 
use of skin color epithets reflect the permeability of racial boundaries. 
“I had never ever heard anybody either call themselves, or refer to anybody else 
as "Black." Never. I heard a thousand other words. My grandmother could 
differentiate about fifteen different shades between light brown and dark brown.” 
(Hall 1997:53). 
“For a Caribbean person to call or (nick-) name a fellow islander of Chinese 
background “Mr. Chin,” a mixed person a “browning” or “red skin girl,” a 
white person “whitey,” or a black person “Blacka” is usually not a show of 
disrespect but rather a neutral observation turned into a form of 
address…Whereas in the United States the category white generally means to 
exclude all those who  have any “non-white blood,” in Jamaica “white” has been 
an inclusive category that embraces not only Anglo-Saxons, but also Jews, 
Syrians, and even some people with multiracial or Chinese background.” (Henke 
2001:56).  
This all led to bolstering non-racial forms of belonging. As a result, many Jamaicans of the post-
independence era who support this non-racial narrative are quick to point out that since 
independence; questions of race have seldom been raised explicitly in Jamaican politics 
(Sherlock and Bennet 1998).  
This supposedly all-inclusive, non-racial nation-building frame in Jamaica stands in 
contrast, for example, to its Caribbean neighbor, the Dominican Republic. Its national ideology 
was developed partly through an openly exclusionary framing that targeted Haiti, Haitians, and 
resident populations in the Dominican Republic perceived as Haitian.  Political leaders such as 
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Trujillo and Balaguer played pivotal roles in the emergence and maintenance of this anti-Haitian, 
and in extension, anti-Afro-descent/anti-black ideology (Sagás 2000). Sagás’ (2000) assessment 
is made more compelling by Ruling 0168-13 of the Dominican Constitutional Tribunal in 2013 
that essentially granted permission for the mass deportation of anyone born in the Dominican 
Republic after 1929 without at least one parent who was a Dominican citizen (Archibold 2013; 
De Castro 2013). Even amidst strong condemnation from CARICOM, the Dominican Republic 
has continued to deport thousands of Dominican-born Haitians (Amnesty International2016; 
Ruiz 2015). 
This creolization ideology -similar to that of mestizaje or racial mixing in Latin America 
and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean- ultimately served as a “legitimizing framework” upon 
which light-skinned, mixed-raced, middle strata Jamaicans could dominate post-independence 
politics (e.g., Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante) (Nas, et. al. 2009), and essentially 
served as a tool of conflict control. The campaigns of nation-building elite’s pushed class to the 
forefront; Alexander Bustamante known as a champion of the working-class and Norman 
Manley had strong socialist leanings. Thus, race and skin color inequality in Jamaica was framed 
as solely a class issue despite the historical and continued presence of a race and skin color 
hierarchy. 
Ethno-Racial Division  
In Jamaica, there are plenty of critics of the creolization and/or the non-racial lens on in 
the late 19th and 20th centuries.  They point out, for example, that it is highly improbable that the 
country’s ethno-racial dynamics could have been so easily channeled into a sense of non-racial, 
nation-based kinship ideology.  Although something akin to creolization may have manifested 
itself through evolving mixed cultural forms in, for example, the first half of the 20th century, 
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sharp ethno-racial boundaries surely persisted.  Thus, for example, beginning in the 1930’s there 
was the rise of Garveyism that closely resembled U.S. Black Nationalism. Parts of this 
movement and ideology later evolved into the race- and color-conscious Rastafarian movement.   
The search for a national cultural identity between the 1940’s and 60’s would be 
consolidated through Creole multiracial nationalism that would legitimate Jamaica as a modern 
and progressive state: accomplished through the development of a version of cultural specificity 
stemming from fusion of secular and sacred practices by black Jamaicans before and after 
emancipation from slavery. Yet, the intellectual emphasis on racial equality from a new creolized 
image would nevertheless reproduce aspects of colonial class/color/cultural hierarchies (Thomas 
2002). Rather counterintuitively, the intellectual elite would continue class domination by acting 
as the cultural and political gatekeepers of the nation over the lower classes (Thomas 2002).  
This focus on class-dynamics ignored the historical and continued ways in which race 
and color were intertwined in the class dynamics evidenced on the island. There was an attempt 
to bring this race/color focus into the public’s sphere by Marcus Garvey through his 
organization, the Universal Negro Improvement Association, and the establishment of 
Rastafarianism. Additionally, the 1930s and 40s would also cultivate a small but elite sect of 
influential intellectuals seeking to incorporate Marxist praxis into the nationalist movement 
through the People’s National Party (PNP) (Thomas 2002).  
While this gained some steam with some sects of the population, the middle classes 
would largely view emphasis towards public racial consciousness as regressive, in contrast to 
those inspired by the sanctification of their African roots through Rastafarianism (Brodber 1987; 
Brodber and Greene 1988; Chevannes 1976; Nettleford 1970). Social and political consciousness 
through Black Nationalism was not only the domain of the urban poor, as the professional 
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middle classes faced an ideological conundrum post-independence. Independence had provided 
them with political power and social mobility, but they still faced economic exclusion due to 
colonial era distributions of land ownership which dictated the access to the growing industries 
of manufacturing and tourism. As such, the middles classes did not experience any growth in 
wealth.  
“In February 1972, the Manley-led PNP [People’s National Party] became the 
government and began a policy of growth with redistribution within the dependent capitalist 
structure” (Bernal 1984:59). The PNP, after seizing power after the 1972 general election, would 
use the heightening of black consciousness, especially mobilizing the Rastafarian movement, 
which emphasized African roots, social awareness, and black redemption, a symbol around 
which they could push their rhetoric. Newly radicalized members of the PNP would attempt to 
circumvent the old elite power structure through consolidating the public sector, thus allowing 
the new rising elites of the middle classes access to economic and political power. Manley’s 
administration would develop and initiate many new social programs, as well as nationalize 
pivotal sectors of the Jamaican economy (Stephens and Stephens 1986). Joining the Non-
Aligned Movement promoted the country’s identification with Africa and the rest of the Third 
World over an emphasis on the British Commonwealth and Jamaicans were encouraged to 
organize in accordance with increased international consciousness around race and feminism 
towards local development. However, Black Nationalism was not explicitly a national focus, as 
despite this heightened racial consciousness, Jamaica’s struggles during this period were 
primarily posited as conflicts of language and class. Universalist interpretations of socialism 
would subsume these conflicts under a need for working-class comradeship over black 
consciousness (Thomas 2002).  
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However, as the Jamaican government, the PNP who had a democratic socialist agenda, 
was unable to sustain consistent economic growth, coupled with increases in violence, it resulted 
in the mass flight of local elites and middle-class in the face of such economic decline in the 
1970s (Bernal 1984). Because of renewed ties with Cuba, the opposition party, the JLP, ventured 
on an anti-communist spurred by U.S. unrest which initiated a CIA campaign to destabilize the 
Manley administration (Bolles 1996). With this, the PNP’s reign came to an end, including the 
country's ties to Cuba and all the social programs planned by Manley. Thus, this shifted 
Jamaica’s economic focus from democratic socialism to free-market capitalism, which motivated 
the return migration of the elite minorities which would result in the displacement and desolation 
of fledgling black owned businesses which had arose in their absence (Stone 1991; Thomas 
2002).  
Seaga’s collaboration with Ronald Reagan on the Caribbean Basin Initiative would also 
reform Jamaica’s foreign relations with the United States and lead to the country’s involvement 
and subsequent dependency on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which 
resulted in increased poverty. The island’s increasing economic disparity would inflame social 
and political violence and encourage emigration. All of this would converge in to a 
reestablishment of a hegemony of whiteness and a “quiet ridiculing and denigration of 
blackness” (Robotham 1993:12). Subsequently, the local population would be signaled an 
intimation that nonalignment, democratic socialism, and blackness brought the country to ruin. 
The JLP’s economic policies would, as such, foster the restoration of the old class/color 
hierarchies (Thomas 2002). 
So it was that in post-independence Jamaica, a whole class of ‘radical’ intellectuals arose 
to challenge the establishment construction of a non-racial Jamaica (Dupuy 1996). Reflecting 
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that critical lens on non-racialism, Cooper (2012) argues, for example, that the nation’s motto 
(‘Out of many, one people’) “marginalizes the nation’s black majority by asserting that the 
idealized face of the Jamaican nation is multiracial.” This assessment suggests support for 
Chaterjee’s (1995) theoretical assertion that the construction of ‘one people’ through processes 
of national consciousness and nation-building often undermines the struggle of subaltern 
populations (see also James, 1998).  Austin-Broos (1994) too counters the suggestion of a mixed, 
non-racial Jamaica, asserting “the enduring pre-eminence of “race” as the meaning that 
specifies Jamaican experience. Racialized notions of ethnicity as rendered in the color 
categories become the central content of Jamaican culture” (p. 215). 
Hence, in the post-independence era, both race-focused and non-racial frames co-existed 
(Nettleford, 1970), and both continue to do so today. The salience of both perspectives is 
apparent in Jamaica’s 2010 report to the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD): 
“Racism does not manifest itself as it does in other countries. The greater 
challenge for Jamaica is overcoming the residual impact of slavery on the society 
as skin color is sometimes approximated with opportunities for upward or social 
mobility. The data that is available and the policies being implemented by the 
Government are not aimed at addressing specific racial groups. The focus of the 
Government’s policies and programs is also on ensuring that measures are in 
place to address the needs of economically and socially disadvantaged groups, 
particularly those who are impoverished or living in depressed communities” 
(UN Doc. CERD/C/JAM/16-20, p. 3). 
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“There are no institutional policies or laws in Jamaica that serve to encourage 
racial discrimination. All racial groups enjoy equal status before the law” (p. 4). 
Even though an acknowledgement is made that skin color is perceived as a determinant for 
upward mobility, the report nonetheless emphasizes that all racial groups enjoy equal status and 
offers no suggestion on how the Jamaican government might address the situation of Afro-
Jamaicans. This is despite numerous observations of discriminatory dynamics in Jamaica made 
by the CERD.  
A striking example of continuing racial and skin color tensions in contemporary Jamaica 
is the ongoing debate on the island surrounding dancehall music. Dancehall is a genre of music 
in Jamaican society that was invented and popularized by the working- and under-class (Thomas 
2002). This style is primarily done in Jamaican creole or Patois and centers on topics of sex, 
violence, and life ‘in the ghetto’. In 2009 there was a ban placed on dancehall music and what 
could be played on radio. Supporters of the ban cited that the lyrics were too vulgar and incited 
violence, especially among the young. However, opponents state that this ban did not stem from 
a concern for inciting violence among the masses, but it was a display of power and class 
(Cooper 2009). Dancehall in and of itself is a display of working-class and, to a significant 
degree, African/Afro-centered culture in the use of creole over English, the fast beats, open 
sensuality, and political and socioeconomic protest discourse regarding colonial power (Cooper 
2004; 2012).  It constitutes a type of counter-culture in resistance to Anglo-centric culture. 
Hence, the distain for dancehall music is interpreted as a remnant of colonialism, a desire to 
control or constrain blackness by presenting it as vulgar, brutish, and uncivilized. Specifically, 
with the global popularity of dancehall music as popular culture, cultural identity is no longer 
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firmly under the influence of the nation’s elites. Though, this debate is focused mostly on class 
differences, there is an obvious but understated race dynamic.  
Therefore, though creolization presented itself in the emergence of mixed cultural forms; 
racial distinctions persisted similarly as it did in Latin America after centering nation building 
around an emphasis on mixed-race individuals (Telles 2004; Telles and Sue 2009). Thus, 
creolization and/or the non-racial lens, in the late 19th and 20th century, was criticized in 
Jamaica for the improbability of channeling a sense of non-racial, nation-based kinship ideology. 
Even with some recognition of both covert and overt racial tension in contemporary Jamaica, the 
privilege associated with lighter skin color is still widely embraced and sought after as evidenced 
by the skin-bleaching epidemic in Jamaica. This practice is representative of the vestiges of 
colonialism left behind in Jamaica (Charles 2009; Johnson 2004).  It is embedded in colorism: 
the notion that lighter or being closer to whiteness is better (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2008; 
Harris 2008; Hannon 2015; Kinsbrunner 1996; Sue 2009; Telles 2004).  Individuals who engage 
in practices of skin bleaching or lightening are mostly portrayed in popular media and 
documentaries as from working-class backgrounds.7 The most common explanation given by 
these individuals is that being of a lighter skin color offers better life-chances and/or preferential 
treatment (Blay 2011; Brown-Glaude 2007; Charles 2003, 2009; Wallace 2010). 
However, bleaching is often framed as pathology: a form of mental illness or the 
manifestation of self-hate (Brown-Glaude 2007; Charles 2003, 2009). This framing effectively 
delegitimizes overarching claims that there are privileges and advantages associated with lighter 
skin in Jamaican society (Wallace 2010).  In addition, skin-bleaching is framed exclusively as a 
class struggle, which is used to support the idea that Jamaica is free of racial problems (Henke 
                                                          
7 For example, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JmY0_l6BNPc&index=26&list=WL 
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2001). In sum, there is little doubt that race and skin color continue to stratify contemporary 
Jamaica. As a group of scholars’ write, “business and politics [were and arguably still are] being 
dominated by lighter skinned Jamaicans, including ethnic groups of Middle Eastern, Asian, and 
Jewish descent” (Nas, et. al. 2009:100). 
It becomes clear, then, that there is substantial debate regarding the salience of a 
transcending national identity I label ethnic oneness in Jamaica that might efficiently subsume 
largely irrelevant ethno-racial boundaries through a lens of admixture or fusion.  Moreover, if an 
ideology of ethnic oneness is indeed a salient, generalized framing in Jamaica, does still structure 
perceptions of nationhood and does is it provoke a denial of racial discrimination?  
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CHAPTER 2 
The Centering of Hybridity in Contemporary Interpretations of Jamaican Nationhood  
 
These frames of Creole Multiracialism and Jamaican Exceptionalism support each other 
by presenting Jamaica as a non-racial society and politicians attempts to foster a ‘one people’ 
national identity effectively functioned as a “legitimizing framework” upon which mixed-race 
and/or light-skinned, middle strata Jamaicans could dominate post-independence politics (Nas, 
et. al. 2009).  The inclusion, and integrally the elevation of hybridity, represented by the 
country’s motto and supporting ideology, formed the nation’s face as ‘brown’ – the embodiment 
of creolization. Hence, hybridity, whether through culture or the body, a requirement for group 
or ethnic inclusion.  
Considering Jamaica’s diffused and unique iteration of an ideology of racial mixing or 
creolization via the nationalist frame of Creole Multi-racialism, I ask: are these beliefs reflected 
in contemporary perceptions and boundary construction of nationhood of Jamaican citizens? 
Given the historical centering of hybridity as the image of what Jamaicanness comprises, is this 
still the case? Using in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 25 adult Jamaican citizens, I 
examine (1) the role of race in the construction and interpretations of nationhood as evidence 
through the continued use of a creole multiracial nationalist frame. Thus, examining the raced 
parameters of Jamaican national identity, (2) the dynamics of race relations on the island, and (3) 
perceptions of racial and color prejudice and discrimination. I argue that interpretations of 
contemporary nationalism still obscure the conflation of race and class while simultaneously 
elevating brownness or hybridity as quintessential to nationhood.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
 The central mode of data collection used for this study was semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews, which were conducted with 25 adult Jamaican citizens (see Apendix A for interview 
guide). Along with this, I used an amended version of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (see 
Appendix B) to assess group boundaries. The Bogardus Social Distance Scale is a psychological 
testing scale created by Emory S. Bogardus to empirically measure people's willingness to 
participate in social contacts of varying degrees of closeness with members of diverse social 
groups, such as racial and ethnic groups. The scale comprises of seven situations that asks people 
the extent to which they would be accepting of each group, which were amended to reflect the 
racial group in Jamaica. Additionally, vignettes were used to garner responses on issues of 
nationalism, colorism, and practices in Jamaica that may be perceived as prejudice or 
discriminatory.  
Lastly, to ascertain ethno-racial status, I used the race question from the Latin America 
Public Opinion Project or Americas Barometer on Jamaica. This question asked, “Do you 
consider yourself black, Indian, white, Chinese, mixed or of another race?” Furthermore, the 
Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) skin color palette (see Appendix C) 
was used to rank respondents skin color starting from very light (1) to very dark (11) (presented 
as SCR – skin color rating). Skin color, in addition to ethno-racial classification was necessary to 
analyze as Blay (2001), Charles (2009), Stone (1973) and Wallace (2010) all cite skin color as 
important in terms of perceptions of privilege and better life outcomes. Therefore, differences in 
skin color, and possibly linked experienced differences in treatment, may affect whether one 
employs a nationalist or colorist frame to discuss issues of color discrimination. To more 
stringently test this, I ensured that respondents were all the same educational level; because of 
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networks it was easier to sample those who had a college degree or more. Hence, interview 
participants are not representative of the Jamaican population.  
To identify participants for the study, I initially approached personal contacts and a high 
school alumni organization. A recruitment message was posted in this alumni association’s 
social media account on Facebook. This recruitment post detailed the topic of the study, types of 
questions to be asked, time frame of interview, and medium through which interviews could be 
conducted. From these initial contacts, interviewees were recruited via snowball sampling. 
Interviews were conducted from April to August of 2017. IRB Guidelines for anonymity and 
confidentiality were followed. Interviews ranged from 30 to 120 minutes and questions consisted 
of open-ended questions about four broad topics: (1) racial and skin tone classifications, (2) race 
relations in Jamaica, (3) perceptions and experiences of colorism/racism in Jamaica, and (4) 
perceptions and experiences of colorism/racism while living aboard.  
As respondents were required to provide retrospective accounts in some of the questions 
asked, the subjectivity and unreliability of memory may introduce reconstructions of the past 
(Snow and Machalek 1983). Regardless, contemporaneous narratives incorporating the past 
(Polletta, Trigoso, Adams, and Ebner 2013) are pertinent to current perceptions and should not 
be disregarded. Finally, social desirability biases are recognized in the study as motivators for 
individuals to provide more optimistic accounts, though the opportunity for someone, even if a 
stranger, to listen to their experiences and perceptions may also encourages honest revelations in 
the recall of the experiences (Morrill, Snow, and White 2007). Although findings from the 
sample cannot be generalized to the Jamaican population, interviews offered fruitful insight into 
beliefs and understanding of Jamaican nationalism, parameters of group membership and the 
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subsequent perceptions of racial and color inequality for a cross-section of the population 
(largely middle-class females).  Table 2.1 includes a sample description of the 25 interviewees. 
  
Table 2.1. Demographic Characteristics of 25 Interview Respondents 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
 
Categories Count  Percentage  
Country residing in at time of interview  Jamaica 
the United States 
Britain 
South America 
Europe 
 
13 
8 
2 
1 
1 
52 
32 
8 
4 
4 
Race  Black 
Mixed-race 
White 
 
14 
10 
1 
56 
40 
4 
 
Sex Male 
Female 
5 
20 
20 
80 
 
Highest level of Education  Completed college 
Graduate school 
13 
12 
52 
48 
 
Employment Status  Unemployed 
Self-employed 
Students 
Part-time worker 
Full-time worker 
1 
3 
9 
1 
11 
4 
12 
36 
4 
44 
 
Marital Status Married/cohabitating/Common law 
Single 
 
10 
15 
40 
60 
Location  Rural 
urban 
7 
18 
28 
72 
 
Age  Min/Max/Mean 25/46/31 
 
Skin Color  
 
Min/Max/Mean 1/10/6.5 
Total 25 
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FIDINGS 
By exploring the four topics covered in my interview guide - (1) racial and skin tone 
classifications, (2) race relations in Jamaica, (3) perceptions and experiences of colorism/racism 
in Jamaica, and (4) perceptions and experiences of colorism/racism while living aboard - several 
themes emerged. However, as this paper focuses on the construction of nationhood for 
contemporary Jamaican citizen, only four themes will be expounded upon. These four themes 
are: Achieved Creolization, The Centering of Hybridity in National Identity, Raced Group 
Dynamics, and Perceptions of Race/Color Prejudice and Discrimination. 
Achieved Creolization 
To assess the prevalence of this ideology of creolization amongst Jamaican citizens in 
contemporary society, interviewees were asked to provide rough estimates of the ethno-racial 
composition of the population. Respondents reported at least 10%, or at most 50%, of the 
population was of mixed race; higher percentages were most common among the interviewees. 
For these estimates, no distinction was made by respondents between black or non-black mixed 
race. When attempts were made to disaggregate this, respondents stated that it was hard to do 
because being of mixed racial ancestry is not always visible but did not dispel the possibility that 
someone could be racially mixed. However, from this assessment it can be surmised that most 
respondents assumed that African ancestry was a forgone conclusion in interpretations of what 
being mixed race meant on the island. Additionally, respondents cited the white, East Indian and 
Chinese population as exceeding 10% of the total population. This conflicts with official 
statistics as the 2001 Jamaican census note that 6.2% of Jamaica’s population self-identify as 
non-black mixed-race, with the remaining 3%, Chinese, East Indian, white, or ‘other’ (World 
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Bank 2013). Claims that Jamaica is a racially mixed society is exemplified by Amelia’s 
comment: 
“I also tend to think everyone at this point is mixed in some way. Even though it 
might not show physically on your skin, like I think I'm mixed. I would consider 
myself mixed in terms of my blood and my heritage, but it doesn't really show 
overtly in my skin color. If I did a DNA test, I'm sure you would find some Irish 
blood in there somewhere, maybe some Indian, you know what I mean? So, I do 
tend to think everyone, at this point, I don't think anyone is strictly African 
anymore. I think we're all mixed, but in terms of the physical appearance how it 
manifest[s] on our skin, that puts me in that block, that says I'm black. But if 
you're lighter and have features like a bigger nose, I would say you're mixed.” 
– Amelia, 28, black, SCR 9  
All respondents expressed similar beliefs to Amelia that Jamaica is a largely racially 
mixed country, with African ancestry being central to that racial mixture. And while majority 
Afro-descent, there is a sizable group of racial others despite global perceptions of the country 
being “just black”. All but one respondent stressed that this racial mixture is based on how 
Jamaicans think of themselves and not necessarily what exists, as in a different context, like the 
U.S., they all would just be seen as black. This perception of high levels of miscegenation on the 
island reflects the acceptance of a creolized or hybrid nation. Most respondents saw the country 
as a true melting pot where the establishment of the hybrid body is so complete that it is 
indistinguishable. Thus, there is an understanding that being Jamaican on some level means 
being mixed; blacks themselves can be mixed, even if dark-skinned (Nettleford 1965, 1970; 
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Thame 2017), like Amelia. Hence, brownness or the hybrid body is centered in the perception of 
nationhood as most respondents believed that the population is mixed in some way. 
The Centering of Hybridity in National Identity  
As so many respondents perceived Jamaica to be a racially mixed society led me to 
discuss boundaries of Jamaicanness. In assessing this, I asked respondents to detail what the 
national motto meant to them as well as to describe their thoughts on who an ideal representation 
of what it means to be Jamaican is. Seven of the 25 respondents stressed that the national motto 
meant that everyone can have equal share in nationhood despite skin color and ethnic 
background and that the ideal Jamaican was someone who simply participated and appreciated 
the culture. Other respondents stated that the motto meant to them that Jamaica was a mixed 
country; both in its people and culture. Thus, the ideal representation of the country had to be 
‘black’ in some way.  When pressed about the racial and/or skin color representation of this 
individual, it was stated that the individual had to be ‘black,’ whether phenotypically or 
culturally.  
 “I think being Jamaican also means that you kind of have black in you. I guess I 
sort of feel like if you're white Jamaican that you're not really Jamaican…I think 
when you asked to describe the ideal Jamaican it should be somebody that's black 
and that's successful… they embrace the culture, but they also embrace other 
cultures, as well. They are a real ambassador for Jamaica, you know. Well, I 
wouldn't say a good ambassador for Jamaica is a white person… I think other 
races that are not black [don’t also fit the ideal image of being Jamaican].” 
– Amelia, 28, black, SCR 9 
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More specifically, 9 respondents stated explicitly that the ideal representation of a 
Jamaican was someone who was racially mixed “who wasn’t too light or too dark” (ranking 
roughly a 6 on the PERLA color palette). Only one respondent stated that this person had to be 
dark-skinned (roughly a 10 or 11 on the PERLA color palette).  
“I think the ideal Jamaican is someone who is mixed, like me. That’s what being 
Jamaican has meant to me, it was what I saw in my family, the friends I had. They 
all were mixed in some way even if it didn’t show outright on them, like in their 
hair or in their skin. They were all mixed with something.” 
– Colleen, 39, mixed, SCR  
Additionally, all respondents stressed that they ideal Jamaican should represent the 
creolized culture. This stress placed on the embrace of Jamaican culture by respondents 
illustrates a Jamaican Exceptionalism frame, as this adaptability signifies harmonious living 
amongst all ethnic groups on the island. But there is also the undertone of a signaling of 
‘blackness’ as requirement for membership. This “blackness”, whether racially mixed or not, 
does not mean having dark skin - as only one respondent stated this - but, as part of a racial or 
hybrid mix. The elevation of mixed racial ancestry as the center of national identity and 
belonging showcases the ideals of Creole Multi-racial nationalism. Respondents, especially those 
who identified as racially mixed themselves, discussed this hybridity found it tenets of 
creolization in terms of the body. This hybrid body was understood and discussed as the 
projected vision of the nation’s people, particularly given the national motto. Hence, mixed racial 
ancestry signaled the ideal of Jamaicanness. 
 Another way in which this hybridity was discussed was in way of culture; the ability to 
speak Patios well in addition to Jamaican Standard English. This is framed as racial and cultural 
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hybridity as indigeneity and distinct to Jamaican culture as separate from that of the British but 
still requiring a measure of civility (Thame 2017).  
“Aside from this [being racially mixed], I would also say that you have to know 
how to chat patwa8, of course not just patwa, you should be able to speak 
Standard Jamaican English as well, but patwa is a must. You can’t be a real 
Jamaican and not know how to speak patwa, you have to represent and partake in 
the culture and language is a big part of it.” 
   – Colleen, 39, mixed, SCR 7  
Jamaican cultural distinctiveness (a sentiment was echoed by all respondents), a 
coalescence of European (Jamaican Standard English) and African (Patios) (Bolland 1998; 
Braithwaite 1971), was further illustrated in the names of individuals presented as ideal 
representations of the nation. Two of the names repeatedly offered were Louise Bennett-
Coverely, a Jamaican folklorist, poet, writer and educator (referred to as the ‘mother of Jamaican 
culture’), and Oliver Samuels, a Jamaican comedian and actor (referred to the Jamaican ‘king of 
comedy’). These were and are cultural figures who have worked towards the popularization of 
Patois in the Arts. However, both were educated in England, which aided in the perceived 
qualifications since their overt use of Patois was not seen as an inability to speak ‘properly’ or a 
lack of civility. This hybridity of culture illustrates a convergence of race/color with class as 
Jamaican Standard English creates respectability while Patois authenticates an individual. This 
was highlighted by statements by respondents that anyone could be Jamaican if they grew up and 
participated in culture; for which the ability to speak Patios was used as a measure.  
As Thomas (2002) argues, the Creole Multi-Racial Nationalism that existed in Jamaica 
up until independence in 1962 was not one that reflected a shared destiny for those of Afro-
                                                          
8 The phonetic spelling of Patios (Cassidy).  
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descent, rather, Jamaican identity was based on common history and culture, and this seem to 
still be the case This ‘one (black) people’ consciousness (Thomas 2004) is widely perceived as 
the commonality in blackness among its people, that is, again, blackness as it relates to a 
creolized body and culture: 
“I also think that because Jamaica is rooted in a creolized culture, which is also 
rooted in black culture, African culture, there is a tendency for people who are 
not black to identify as such... You grow up in a black majority country and you 
ascribe to a black culture, that's part of what being black is, outside of skin tone, 
obviously.” 
-Elizabeth, 33, mixed, SCR 8 
In Elizabeth’s quote the channeling of a “one people” narrative is seen, or more specially, 
as Thomas (2004) states, the redefining of a “out of many, one (black) people”’ (p. 1). The 
elevation of the nation’s black population through the ideology of Jamaican Exceptionalism, 
along with tenets of Creole Multiracialism creates an idealized face of Jamaica that is black 
multiracial in the perceptions of Jamaican citizens. Therefore, ‘blackness’ in way of mixed racial 
ancestry, skin color (i.e. brownness), and/or language capabilities is made a requirement. Thus, 
this shared Creole Multiracial Nationalist identity remains part of the country’s legacy in 
continuing racial hierarchy as Jamaicanness is understood as mixedness (Thame 2017).  
Raced Group Dynamics 
This was further evidence in discussion of group dynamics on the island. Despite beliefs 
about the population ethno-racial demographics in Jamaica and sharing in this racially mixed 
ideology, many presented racist stereotypes about racial/ethnic groups present on the island as 
well as discussed ways in which racial domination is (or perceived to be) maintained in Jamaica. 
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To get at this, I asked respondents what some of the things were, both good and bad, that they 
had heard about the different groups present in Jamaica and if they believed power and respect 
was allocated differently amongst them. Blacks were stereotyped as physically strong, 
hardworking, and loud/vibrant; which was also replicated the characteristics respondents cited as 
representing what being Jamaican meant to them in terms of valued personality traits. This was 
directly juxtaposed to those who were mixed-race, who were framed as physically more 
desirable, privileged, and educated. All respondents spoke of the perception that lighter skin 
automatically signaled mixed racial status, and thus, middle class status.  
“In terms of the jobs, there's still a lot of people who, yeah, they will look at 
potential employees and think the lighter-skinned person must come from a better 
background. They must be better educated and must be more intelligent just from 
seeing the fact that they have lighter skin. Again, I think a lot of that is the 
assumption lighter skin means more money. If you come from more money, you 
would have had a better education. Then naturally you're going to be more 
intelligent, stuff like that. You're going to speak better. I think it's again that tie 
that we have between skin color and class, where the assumption is if you're 
lighter skinned, you're coming from a higher class so there's certain things that 
you have somebody who's darker wouldn't have.” 
 – Faith, 40, mixed, SCR 3   
Though many blacks in Jamaica claim hybridity (being racially mixed in some way; see 
quote by Amelia above as an example), “the qualification of “light skin” continues to remain the 
source of status and power” (Thame 2017:122), thus valued for itself (Broom 1954).  
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‘White’ Jamaicans, which encompasses those of Middle Eastern background as well as some 
extremely light-skinned mixed-race or Afro-Jamaicans, were overall framed as powerful, 
wealthy, respected, and exclusive, with many respondents citing some level of discomfort with 
the group. Similarly, discomfort and perceived exclusion was perceived for other non-black 
groups on the island. For example, all respondents spoke of the isolation of the Chinese: 
“I think that there is an attempt at a certain level of, I don't want to say 
segregation, but there is a separation between the groups and an inherent 
hesitation to integrate heavily amongst Chinese and Asians specifically. 
Obviously being half Asian, that applies to me personally less.”  
– Elizabeth, 33, mixed, SCR 8  
But many respondents recognized the economic power the group continues to secure for 
themselves on the island. This display of economic prowess is both viewed positively and 
negatively. This monopoly of the retail sector in Jamaica is viewed to have stemmed from the 
group’s distinctive cultural capital. Thus, Chinese-Jamaicans are business minded and the respect 
for this specific skillset is denoted in informal forms of address as Jamaicans commonly refer to 
all Asians (except East Indians) as “Mr./Mrs/Ms. Chin.” While this form of address may be 
viewed as derogatory in some ways as there is the underlying presumption that all East Asians in 
Jamaica are Chinese, it still showcases a form of difference as they are the only ethno-racial 
group on the island that is given a formal title as part of their informal, observational, descriptor 
(Henke 2001). However, due to the Chinese’s monopoly of wealth - many interviewees stated 
that the group would rather recruit a distant relative from their homeland to succeed them in their 
businesses rather than promote any of their black workers to managerial positions - the group is 
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viewed as “stingy,” “all for themselves,” and “mean” (in reference to money), which is further 
encapsulated by their perceived aversion to interracial marriage9.   
“I would say the Chinese, they can be a little more exclusive, more into 
themselves, they stick to their culture, and they really don't marry outside their 
race, from what I've seen, at least.”  
 – Amelia, 28, black/mixed, SCR 9   
Here the continuation of 20th century discord between Chinese and Afro-Jamaicans are evidence 
as the Chinese are still seen as insular (Lee-Loy 205).  
This view of exclusion and hoarding of wealth was also attributed to East Indians, who 
are labeled as ‘coolies’; which again while derogatory, is used as an informal descriptor for the 
group but mostly for those who are perceived as being “mixed with [East] Indian.” 
“Coolie mentality is a thing I've always heard about my entire life. I've heard it 
from my parents. I've heard it from friends. I've heard it from people in 
conversation. They talk about "thieving Coolies" and they're always looking to 
haggle and try to skimp on spending money... Most people if you ask them about 
Coolies, that's one of the things they're going to say.”  
– Faith, 40, mixed, SCR 3   
Here the belief or accusation that was once placed on Chinese as engaging in unfair practices 
(Lee-Loy 2015:147-148) have been transposed to East Indians. The word ‘coolie’ was 
historically used to refer to Chinese indentured labor, however as it has been appropriated to 
address East Indians, the stereotypes surrounding the terms as shifted to the group.  
                                                          
9 Also, there were numerous stories from women in my sample about their, a relative, or friend’s personal 
experience regarding this issue of intermarriage, both between Jamaicans of Chinese and East Indian descent.  
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Despite the perception of economic success and purposeful isolation from blacks or non-
blacks in Jamaica, a third of interviewees did not have extensive, continued, and/or intimate 
contact with individuals from these groups despite all identifying as middle class. Most 
interactions with these groups were limited to school (high school specifically) and that was 
largely due to which high schools’ respondents attended. There are schools in Jamaica that are 
known to have higher percentages of non-black Jamaicans than others. This, inadvertently, was 
further used as evidence to confirm the exclusivity and isolation of the groups, particularly 
whites, Chinese, and East Indians, from blacks.  
Many qualified these perceptions of racial groups on the island by stressing that this was 
not what they personally thought, however, when given the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, 
responses reflected these same feelings. This scale made respondents very uncomfortable, with a 
few wanting to make it known for the record that rankings were only done because they were 
asked, and one respondent outright refused to complete the scale. Results from the scale also 
showed that many felt the least comfortable with Chinese and white Jamaicans; they were often 
the group chosen when asked which group they would feel most comfortable expelling from the 
island. When respondents were asked to elaborate, they reiterated the argument that the 
Chinese10 are insular and refuse to assimilate and that whites are too far removed from Jamaican 
culture.  
This illustrates that hybridity continues to be centered in Jamaican nationhood. As 
creolization and/or hybridity refers to the convergence of African and European (Braithwaite 
1971) or of the old and new world to create something new (Bolland 1998); it is understandable 
that that which is too direct a reflection of colonialism (i.e. white Jamaicans) or not a part of this 
                                                          
10 A note here is that the attitudes towards Chinese may be largely influenced by current neoliberal and neocolonial 
activities in Jamaica.  
51 
 
mixture, is casted outside the bounds of nationhood. So, while respondents themselves perceive 
Jamaica as a racially mixed society where anyone can participate in the culture, views of who fits 
within nationhood are obviously raced.  
Perceptions of Race/Color Prejudice and Discrimination  
On the topic of perceptions of race and/or skin color prejudice and discrimination with 
interview participants, this was explicitly captured in the way respondents discussed the ways in 
which they thought race and skin color mattered in their treatment or the treatment of others. It 
was common for respondents to unconsciously equate non-black ethno-racial membership and 
lighter skin to higher levels of wealth and education.  
“I think my skin tone was less of an issue more so than my being mixed was an 
issue. I think being mixed kind of gave this connotation that I was from a certain 
class or that I had a certain amount of money or that I was different from 
everybody else.” 
 – Elizabeth, 33, mixed, SCR 8   
 
“I think a lot of that is the assumption lighter skin means more money. If you 
come from more money, you would have had a better education. Then naturally 
you're going to be more intelligent, stuff like that. You're going to speak better. I 
think it's again that tie that we have between skin color and class, where the 
assumption is if you're lighter skinned, you're coming from a higher class so 
there's certain things that you have somebody who's darker wouldn't have.”  
– Faith, 40, mixed, SCR 3  
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Some respondents even cited ways in which this assumption of the linkage between race, 
and specifically skin color seen in the workplace and other social interactions. 
“I have a friend who is extremely dark skinned. She's also fairly voluptuous girl, 
you know, she's not slim. She's also one of the wealthiest people in Jamaica. I 
mean, I'm not going to say her name, but she comes from one of the wealthiest 
families in Jamaica. She wears a presidential Rolex on her hand every single day 
and people assume that she is poor, regardless of what arena she's in. We will go 
to a bar and they'll immediately ask for her card for payment, instead of allowing 
her to keep a tab.” 
– Elizabeth, 33, mixed, SCR 8 
Like Elizabeth, some respondents noted how this assumption of level and quality of 
education was showcased in the workplace and in schools (when respondents were in high 
school) in terms of who was penalized for what actions. For example, Faith (40, mixed, SCR 3) 
noted in her interview that she dressed casually at work, but this was not made an issue, nor was 
she taken less seriously as compared to her darker skinned, female colleague. This was echoed 
by Collen (38, black/mixed, SCR 8) as she also had observed similar dynamics in the workplace. 
Further illustrating racial/color stereotypes, Marie (26, mixed, SCR 6) stated that her work 
colleagues always assumed she was not able to perform domestic tasks and always expressed 
shock when she did. For example, they would never expect her to perform any physical tasks like 
being able to cook for herself and so forth. 
In relation to school dynamics, Marie also recounted an incident that made national news. 
The story was about two students who spat in the water they later offered to a teacher. This made 
national news because while such action would warrant immediate expulsion, punitive action 
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issued by the school was delayed and menial. This was especially problematic and caused 
national outrage as this was believed to have only been possible because one of the students 
involved was from one of the well-known, minority, elite families in Jamaica. Therefore, while 
skin color and racial biases do not express themselves as explicitly in schools and the workplace 
as it once did historically (as seen from the past exclusivity in traditional high school attendance 
and worker selection in the service industry), they still remain very much intact.  
However, the acknowledgement of such is conflicted. For example, Faith, 40, mixed, SCR 3, 
stated: 
“Growing up in Jamaica, you can't miss the fact that a lot of the wealthier people 
have the fairer skin. That has been the case for as long as I can remember. [later 
in the interview] The most prejudiced people I do know here in Jamaica are the 
Jamaicans that have never traveled. They're the ones that they judge everybody 
that is a little different from them, everybody that looks different, whether dark, 
light or mixed, whatever. They're the ones, their views are so closed. They're the 
ones who will make the most accusations of being held down by other people's 
discrimination and prejudice. They can't actually think around an issue to see if 
there are other causes or other factors. They'll automatically jump to whatever's 
the simplest explanation which will be skin color or class difference or both of 
them.” 
Even though Faith recognizes and agrees that there is racial/color inequality present in 
Jamaica, she still present a counter class argument that in her view accounts for why would claim 
the two as central causes for discrimination. Faith’s reference to travel reflects a class argument 
because those who can travel internationally, specifically those who can do so for recreational 
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purposes, is limited to those who possess the resources to do so, both financially and socially. 
Hence, the argument regarding race/color prejudice and discrimination becomes cyclical; those 
who are lighter skin tend to be wealthier, but those who do not have the class capital to travel 
intentionally lack reasonably foresight to accurately discern the cause of their oppression outside 
of color and class. This viewpoint is reflective of the sample as many thought social class was a 
more valid mechanism of why inequality existed on the island and in terms of race, it was 
viewed as unimportant, subtle, or not as extreme as the U.S. case. 
“I don't think it's overt racism in the same way that we see in the US for example. 
Again, maybe just because of our heritage, because there has been a lot of 
mixing, I don't think it's as overt as it was back in the days of slavery. Obviously, 
there was racism then. They thought black people were nothing and just barely 
better than animals. I definitely don't think it's anywhere near that level now, but I 
think there is still subtle racism in that there is still maybe unconscious biases. 
They think that people who are darker skinned are less educated, less intelligent, 
less likely to have certain opportunity ... I think because it's still very closely 
linked to class for us, we have a lot of classism. There's a lot of obvious classism, 
which again, ends up being very closely aligned to race. It's there, but I don't 
think it's as overt as in some other places.”  
- Faith, 40, mixed, SCR 3 
As respondents were using the U.S. or the U.K as their reference point, Jamaica of course 
would not then have a ‘race problem’; despite explicit recognition that lighter skin and non-black 
status signals wealth, higher levels of education, and greater command of the English language. 
Even for those respondents who acknowledged that colorism was still an issue on the island, they 
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would ultimately return to class as the sole significant element of inequality. This was further 
illustrated when respondents were asked to state how important they thought particular factors 
were in contributing to poverty on the island. The factors presented to interviewees were; (a) 
laziness, little or no ambition, (b) lack of equal opportunity in Jamaican Society, (c) poor money 
management, and (d) prejudice and discrimination against persons because of their color or race. 
Despite majority listing lack of opportunity and racial/color discrimination as somewhat 
important, many still cited individual, behavioral reasonings as just as or more important in 
explaining poverty.  
 
DISCUSSION  
I began this study asking whether the frame of Creole Multi-Racial Nationalism 
accompanied by the ideology of Jamaican Exceptionalism used during nation building efforts in 
the 20th century was reflected in contemporary understandings of nationhood. I wanted to 
explore the role of race in orienting understandings of nationhood and the allocation and 
retention of power. The salience of this question lies in the historical and contemporary ethno-
racial inequality in Jamaica (Kelly and Bailey 2018), and the argument by a group of scholars 
that ideologies of racial mixing, creolization, or ethnic fusion perpetuate social inequality 
(Bonilla-Silva and Glover 2005; Warren and Sue 2011; Winant 1999). By extending this 
discussion to the Anglo-Caribbean country of Jamaica that differs from Ibero-America in its 
colonial past and predominantly Afro-descent population, a more nuanced understanding of such 
ideology and its relation to social inequality is offered. My analysis of semi-structure, in-depth 
interviews data suggests three core findings: (1) Jamaicans strongly adhere to creolized or racial 
mixing ideology, (2) despite this, there are conflicting frames of “one nation or unity,” as 
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constructions of nationhood are heavily raced, with brownness or the hybrid body and culture 
placed at the center and (3) Jamaicans overwhelmingly focus on class for explaining social 
inequality, despite acknowledge of race and color based preferential treatment.  
Findings indicate that like Ibero-America there is a strong sense of a racial mixing 
ideology. This ideology presents a hegemonic ideal that all Jamaicans, regardless of race or 
racial ancestry, are ‘pure Jamaicans’ despite consensual believe of the existence of a race and 
color-based hierarchy11. However, there is a strong sense that ‘brownness’ is preferable which 
was reflected in consistent appraisal of what lighter-skin signified in Jamaican society; greater 
wealth, higher levels of education and language capabilities. The success of the nationalist frame 
of Creole Multiracialism, which is encapsulated in the nation’s motto, has removed race and/or 
skin color in the minds of Jamaicans as a substantial and independent variable determining the 
distribution of resources in Jamaican society, despite all respondents citing behaviors believed to 
inform inequity as racialized. Since the national motto relies on an understanding of 
Jamaicanness as mixedness, it obscures the raced nature of inequality (Thame 2017) which 
marginalizes the black population (Cooper 2012).  Unlike Sidaius and Pratto (1999) that found 
that European was framed as better than African in Dominica Republic, this was no quite the 
case in Jamaica. Yet, there is still evidence of social dominance as blackness, or more 
specifically black racial-mixedness, is framed as the ideal and imperative to nationalism.  
Based on this finding, I argue that frames of nationhood, coupled with references and 
comparisons to the U. S. function to relegate the role of race and color in orienting social 
inequality. While there is a mismatch between the association of race and color to social 
inequality, with interviewees only linking race and color to attitudes/behaviors rather than 
institutional, unlike what has been documented in the literature on the effects of racial mixing 
                                                          
11 See also Sidanius et al. 2001 for similar finding in the Dominican Republic.  
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ideology and its ability to obfuscate racial discrimination this was not the case in Jamaica.  
Racial mixing ideology, as represented by Creole Multiracialism, is not completely color blind. 
Except for one respondent, all interviewees had travelled or lived outside of Jamaica for several 
years. Therefore, it can be argued that interaction with the racist structure with countries such as 
the U.S and UK via travel or media has subsequently shaped understandings of what racism is, in 
today’s society. With the U.S. as the standard, Jamaica with its differential history of nation 
building (one of racial democracy as opposed to the U.S.’s outright exclusion of non-whites) 
would therefore not have racism. Though, respondents framed racism as belonging to the U.S. 
they did recognize that there is colorism in Jamaican society, however, class was listed as a mean 
through which one can escape the effects of this (money whitening or lightening, is this case).  
 Another way in which this raced nature of inequality is minimized is by the shift in the 
class status of blacks during Michael Manley’s prime ministerial reign from 1972-1980. During 
this time period, due to Manley’s socialist leanings, many mixed-race and non-black elites left 
Jamaica (Bernal 1984; Thomas 2002). This naturalization of key sectors within the economy, 
boosted by the creation of many social programs (Stephens and Stephens 1986), provided space 
for black Jamaicans to gain social mobility. However, after the Manley’s reign came to an end, 
including the country's ties to Cuba and all the social programs planned by Manley, Jamaica’s 
economic focus shifted from democratic socialism to free-market capitalism. This motivated the 
return migration of the elite minorities which would result in the displacement and desolation of 
fledgling black owned businesses which had arose in their absence (Stone 1991; Thomas 2002). 
What followed was a reforming of foreign relations with the U.S., which then led the country to 
be dependent on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. What resulted was 
increased poverty, social and political violence, and a reestablishment of old class and color 
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hierarchies in Jamaica (Thomas 2002). Because during this timeframe, the class status of black 
Jamaicans increased (Gordon 1991), very few recognize how this economic shift in Jamaica 
reinforced class and color hierarchies.  
Additionally, the demographics of the population may also be a factor in why these 
frames of nationhood are able to have the influence they do in making race and color seemingly 
inconsequential in Jamaican society. Particularly because of most Jamaicans are of varying 
degree of African ancestry, the average Jamaican citizen is hypothetically able to find black role 
models in all spheres of life, from the very rich and famous to the very poor and disadvantaged. 
This rendering blackness insignificant, hence the nation not read as hierarchized racially.  
However, relative to much of Latin America, research suggests that Jamaica has not seen as 
historically high levels of intermarriage between ethno-racial populations (Sio 1976).  Hence, 
Jamaican beliefs about its mixed origins may be more an “imagined community” (Anderson 
2006) than one in which a key motor of ethno-racial boundary crossing is ethno-racial 
intermarriage. While it is true that perceptions that a social fact is true may be just as important 
to it being of consequence, this may be tempered regarding the efficacy of myths of national 
origins. Relative rates of ethno-racial marriage may indeed be important and need further 
exploration. Furthermore, the census does group all Jamaicans of Afro-descent as ‘black.’ This 
grouping ignores the ways in which claims to non-black ancestry and having lighter skin, which 
is oftentimes viewed as a sign of racially mixed ancestry, denotes and allocates power; an 
acknowledgement made by respondents.  
The privileging of lighter skin and mixed-race status has its historical roots from the 
structuring of work on plantations. Lighter skinned blacks, usually the progeny of violent and 
forced sexual assaults between white-owning planters and slaves, were given domestic rather 
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than manual labor like darker skinned blacks (Altink 2009; Johnson 2004). This privileging was 
based on proximity to whiteness which resulted in better life outcomes in the colonial racial 
hierarchy (Johnson 2004; Sio 1976; Thame 2017) and thus positioned mixed-race, lighter-skin, 
middle-strata Jamaicans ascent to political leadership. Considering the political opposition and 
subversion of Black Nationalism during the strife for independence (Brown-Glaude 2007; 
Campbell and Vallette 2014; Hamilton 1978; Johnson 2005; Nettleford 1965, 1970), this 
privileging was further consolidated by the uplifting of hybridity through Creole Multiracial 
Nationalism. This continues to be the cases as all but one of my respondents who identified as 
racially mixed, explicitly cited themselves as being the ideal representation of Jamaicanness, as 
opposed to my black respondents who cited traits are stated nationally known figures. Therefore, 
despite the racial composition of the population and documented levels of miscegenation, 
Jamaican nationhood is heavily raced, with the hybrid body and culture placed at the center. 
Thus, those who cannot lay authentic claims to this hybridity are placed outside the bounds of 
nationhood as evidence from the conflicting ways in which respondents discussed who 
constitutes the nation’s “one people”.  
Also, as all respondents were college educated; those who were not born into middle-
class status were able to attain this through education. Consequently, race and/or color has not 
restricted their social mobility, further relegating the workings of race/color to interpersonal 
interactions. The class of respondents may also account for the classed nature of how 
Jamaicanness was framed; language capabilities. The ability to speak both Jamaican Standard 
English and Patios was used as a mark of authenticity. This showcases the classed element of 
nationhood, as not only skin color but language use is used to signal and discern class 
background. Jamaican Standard English creates respectability while Patois authenticates an 
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individual. The requirement placed on both as signifiers of being ideally Jamaican is another way 
in which color and class domination is maintained.  
However, this dual language requirement may change if the sample was diversified by 
social class; which is a point of future study and limitation of this study. Overall, responses of 
respondents reflect the often time scholarly discrepancies between independent effects of 
race/color and class, but with historical understanding, we see why race/colorblind ideologies 
fail.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Jamaican Ethnicized Oneness: The Masking of Racial Discrimination12? 
The regions of Latin America and the Caribbean have uniquely diverse ethno-racial 
populations.  Their origins span the globe, with a history of European conquest and 
subordination (including genocide) of indigenous peoples, the importation of millions of African 
slaves for planation economies, and international labor migration, including from Asia.  In these 
respects, Latin America and the Caribbean are similar to the U.S.  Also similar to the U.S. case, 
the legacies of these movements of peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to play 
out in the persistence of significant social stratification along ethno-racial lines. Centuries later, 
the descendants of European colonizers (often categorized as ‘whites’) are generally at the top of 
ethno-racial hierarchies. The descendants of the original inhabitants (Indigenous peoples) and of 
African slaves (individuals of varying degrees of discernible African ancestry, often categorized 
as ‘blacks’) continue to occupy positions of disadvantage across all of the Americas (Bailey, 
Saperstein, and Penner 2014).       
What accounts for the stability of ethno-racial hierarchy in ‘New World’ societies across 
centuries? A complete answer to that question is indeed complex and well beyond the reach or 
intent of this study.  Nonetheless, we focus on one element that many scholars view as central to 
the maintenance of systems of domination pervasive throughout Latin America and parts of the 
Caribbean in the 20th and into the 21st centuries: ideologies of ‘racial mixing’  (e.g., Hernandez 
2016; Paschel and Sawyer 2008; Warren and Sue 2011).13  An ideology of mixing is a set of 
ruling ideas that positively characterize a country’s population as being of “mixed” ethno-racial 
                                                          
12 This chapter is published as a co-authored article in Social Identities, therefore, the language throughout will 
reflect this.  
13 Although we prefer the concept ‘population admixture’ (cf. Bryc et al. 2015), we use ‘racial mixing’ instead, as 
preferred by most of the literature we engage. 
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origin, often undergirding robust nation-based and/or racially ambiguous identifications (Bonilla-
Silva and Grover 2008; Sue 2013).  Scholarship have identified one of the origins of mixing 
ideologies in nation-building projects attempting to: (1) unify populations through privileging 
nation-based kinship over ethno-racial kinship boundaries, and/or (2) counteract the association 
of modernity with white racial purity, white superiority, and of the supposed error of racial 
mixing asserted by leading scientists in the U.S. and Europe (Bailey 2009; Loveman 2014).   
As scholars note, countries where mixing ideologies are salient are often marked by 
ethno-racial stratification.  How do contemporary scholars assert a causal connection between 
ideologies of racial mixing with white racial dominance across Latin America?  They do so by 
positing that mixing ideologies produce a generalized denial of racial discrimination (Hanchard 
1994; Paschel and Sawyer 2008).  This obfuscating effect of mixing ideologies is thought to be 
particularly strong among individuals or populations who self-identify using racially ambiguous 
or nation-based categories (Bonilla-Silva and Grover 2008; Twine 1998; Warren and Sue 2011).  
Examples of the popular terminology that scholars often correlate with a lack of ‘racial 
consciousness’ include: ‘morenos’ in Brazil, as in the phrase ‘we are all morenos’ (Guimarães 
2001), ‘mestizos’ and ‘mexicanos’ in Mexico, from the idea of a Mexican cosmic race (Sue 
2013), and ‘dominicanos’ in the Dominican Republic (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001). 
 Robust empirical work on the relationship between ideologies of mixing and the 
denial of racial discrimination, the latter conceptualized as a ‘stratification belief’ (e.g., Kluegel 
and Smith 1981), is scarce concerning Latin America.  Moreover, existing studies on that 
relationship in Latin America appear to fall into two camps.  While one group of scholars argues 
that ideologies of mixing have produced a widespread denial of racial discrimination across 
Latin America (Hanchard 1994; Paschel and Sawyer, 2008; Warren and Sue 2011; Winant 
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1999), another has documented the opposite (Bailey 2009; Telles and Bailey 2013).  These 
existing studies address Latin America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (part of Ibero-
America); we know very little about the English-speaking Caribbean (part of Anglo-America).   
The Ibero-Anglo divide, conceptualized here as a colonial cleavage between the Spanish 
and Portuguese Crowns, on one side, and the British Crown, on the other, may be useful for 
understanding the possible effects of ideologies of mixing on stratification beliefs. The 
importance of understanding a population’s stratification beliefs rests on the association of those 
beliefs to openness to anti-inequality strategies (Bobo, Charles, Krysan, and Simmons 2012).  To 
begin to explore further the relationship of mixing ideology and stratification beliefs in the 
Americas, we bring into dialogue the case of Jamaica, an English-speaking country colonized by 
the British Crown.  We explore Jamaican explanations for black poverty, as well as the salience 
of a national ideology of mixed origins that we term ‘ethnic oneness.’ We then examine whether 
or not an embrace of ethnic oneness affects the likelihood that Jamaicans acknowledge racial 
discrimination as structuring social inequality. We use quantitative methods and nationally 
representative data on Jamaica from the 2008 Americas Barometer social survey.   
The Effect of Myths of Mestizaje  
Group conflict theory scholar hold that where there is embedded racial hierarchy, there 
should theoretically exist either significant race-based mobilization (fueled by racial grievances) 
or a generalized denial of racial discrimination among the minority racial population (Sears, 
Sidanius, and Bobo 2000).  Specifically, in Latin American and the some of the Caribbean, in the 
absent of mass Afro-Latin mobilizations (Telles 2004), group conflict theorists have long held 
that a denial of systematic disadvantage suffered by racial and ethnic minorities characterizes 
public opinion (e.g., Hanchard 1994; Paschel and Sawyer 2008).  This dominant perspective 
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attributes that denial to entrenched ideologies of mestizaje or racial democracy that obfuscates 
the structural causes of ethno-racial inequality (Hernández 2016). These ideologies are 
alternatively conceptualized as ‘color blindness’ (Paschel 2010), ‘race-blindness’ (Sue 2011), 
and ‘false consciousness’ (Sidanius Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Winant 1999).  Moreover, racial 
mixing ideologies are found to be especially pervasive among the majority masses of non-elites 
and non-whites (Twine 1998; Sue 2013).  In Ecuador, for example, Beck, Miskeski, and Stark 
(2011:106) write, “mestizaje, and the wide swath of people who clearly identify as mestizo, 
produces a perceptual prism in which it is quite easy to ignore, hide, downgrade, and ultimately 
deny processes of prejudice and discrimination.” Similarly, Warren and Sue (2011:50) write that 
across Latin America non-whites have “scant understanding of how race, both its contemporary 
and historical forms, is directly linked to the particular configurations of the labor market, social 
welfare, taxation policies, housing, educational opportunities, and so forth.”  
While cognizant of challenges to this group conflict perspective (to which we return 
below), given that it is a dominant approach, we use it here to explore the Jamaican context 
regarding: (1) generalized beliefs about the role of color in structuring poverty, (2) the salience 
of a national ideology of ethnic oneness, and (3) the analytic association of an embrace of the 
ethnic oneness ideology to Jamaican stratification beliefs.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Our data are from the 2008 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in 
Jamaica.  It was conducted by Vanderbilt University (home to the LAPOP) and the Center for 
Leadership and Governance of the University of West Indies at Mona.  The project used a 
national probability sample design of voting age adults; the full sample comprised 1,499 
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respondents in face-to-face interviews.  The sample was stratified by regions (Kingston 
Metropolitan Region, Surrey, Middlesex, Cornwall) and by urban and rural areas. The estimated 
margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5 percentage points.   
Our analytic strategy uses multinomial logistic regression and nested modeling on full 
and subpopulation samples.  The core dependent variable represents Jamaican beliefs about the 
role of skin color/race in structuring disadvantage in that national context, or Jamaican racial 
stratification beliefs.  To operationalize that concept, we used one item from the following multi-
item survey question:  
“Now thinking of persons who are poor in Jamaica, I’m going to read to you 
some possible reasons or causes why people are poor in Jamaica.  For each 
cause, indicate how important you feel that cause is in holding people back, in 
keeping them poor.”  
Option: “Prejudice and discrimination against persons because of their color 
or race.”  
There were three response options to gauge the respondents’ beliefs about the possible 
role of skin color or race in explaining poverty: (1) ‘very important cause,’ (2) ‘important cause,’ 
or (3) ‘not an important cause.’  We reversed the coding for our models so that higher values 
signified higher levels of importance.  
The key concept that we hypothesize as associated with a denial of racial discrimination 
in Jamaica is an ideology of ethnic oneness. We operationalize that concept with the survey item: 
‘Despite our differences, we Jamaicans have many things that unite us a country.  How much do 
you agree or disagree with this statement?’  Responses for the item ranged on a scale from one 
(strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree); we recoded these responses into three categories 
66 
 
reflecting different levels of embrace of the ethnic oneness perspective: low (1-4), medium (5-6), 
and high (7).  We posit that this item captures a core element of Jamaica’s dominant ethno-racial 
ideology enshrined in its official country motto from its state seal: ‘Out of many, one people.’  
This belief may act as an originating myth: it asserts an overarching unity and/or kinship among 
the population (‘one people’) that supersedes and renders much less important all other 
characteristics that may mark alternative kinship cleavages (‘out of many’).  
Our models include controls for various socio-demographic factors: respondent’s sex, 
age, ethno-racial status, years of education, and urbanicity. Respondent’s sex was measured by a 
dummy variable (1 = male, 0 = female). Respondents’ age was measured as a continuous 
variable ranging from 18 to 96.  Respondents were asked to report their ethno-racial status in one 
of the following categories:  black, white, Indian, Chinese, mixed, other.  Due to small sample 
sizes in non-black categories, responses were dummy-coded as ‘black’ (about 90%, our reference 
category) and ‘other’ (10%).14  Education was captured by a continuous variable (1-18) 
representing the number of years of schooling respondents completed.  A dummy variable was 
used to capture location/area (1 = ‘rural’, 0 = ‘urban’).  An area was considered urban if it had a 
population of 2,000 or more persons and provided several amenities and facilities that in Jamaica 
indicate modern living. To focus specifically on Afro-Jamaicans, we also ran these same models 
isolating the black subpopulation. Table 3.1 presents frequency distributions of our analysis’ 
variables. 
 
 
                                                          
14 The specific question asked in the questionnaire was: ‘Do you consider yourself black, Indian, white, Chinese, 
mixed or of another race?’  
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RESULTS 
We first turn to our descriptive results on ethno-racial diversity and inequality in 
Jamaica.  Figure 3.1, first panel, offers an overview of the ethno-racial composition of Jamaica 
per its 2001 Census.  It shows that Jamaica is overwhelming black, at fully 91.6 percent.  The 
second largest population segment is comprised of those individuals self-classifying as ‘mixed’ 
(6.9 percent). Each of the remaining categories represents about one percent or less of the 
Jamaican population in 2001:  white, Chinese, Indian, and other.  Overall, although Jamaica is 
diverse in terms of ethno-racial populations, the African descent category makes up its 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Variables Number Percentage 
Racial Discrimination   
     Not important 312 27.7% 
     Somewhat important 334 29.7% 
     Very important 480 42.6% 
   
Ethnic Oneness 
     Low (1 to 4) 
     Medium (5 to 6) 
     High (7) 
 
200 
366 
560 
 
17.8% 
32.5% 
49.7% 
   
Female 
Male 
552 
574  
49.0% 
51.0% 
 
Average Age 
 
43.7 
 
 
Black 
All others 
1012  
114  
 
89.9% 
10.1% 
Average years of education 13.9 
 
 
Rural 
Urban 
667 
459  
59.2% 
40.8% 
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overwhelming majority, whereas whites are only a very small fraction of Jamaicans, at 0.2 
percent. The black majority population, however, does not fare well in terms of socio-economic 
status.  Two summary indicators suffice for revealing Jamaica’s dramatic inequalities along 
ethno-racial lines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: 
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Figure 3.2, first panel, shows educational attainment in Jamaica by ethno-racial category 
in 2001.  Whereas 40.7 percent of white Jamaicans (ages 25 to 65) have university-level 
education completed, only 2.4 percent of Afro-Jamaicans attain that level.  Chinese, Indian and 
mixed Jamaicans also have university completed at much lower percentages than whites, though 
significantly higher than Afro-Jamaicans, at 13.9, 6.0, and 7.6, respectively. Figure 3.2, second 
panel, lists Jamaica’s most prestigious occupations—managers, professionals, and top officials—
by ethno-racial category in 2001.  It shows that fully 16 percent of the small white population 
attains jobs in that highest prestige category, whereas only 3.1 percent of the majority Afro-
Jamaican population does so. Interestingly, though, it is the very small Chinese-Jamaican 
population that is most successful in attaining these highest prestige occupations in Jamaica; 
although they make up only 0.2 percent of the national population, almost 40 percent of that 
segment is positioned at the top of the occupation hierarchy.  In sum, Figure 3.2 acts as a visual 
representation of Jamaica’s ethno-racial inequality in education and occupation; it starkly 
suggests that although that nation’s motto tells a tale of ‘one people,’ the reality of glaring ethno-
racial inequality tells a very different story.  
70 
 
 
Amid stark ethno-racial hierarchy, we turn now to public opinion data on the salience of 
an ideology of ethnic oneness in Jamaica. The results shown in Table 3.1 suggest that, despite 
dramatic inequality, this ideology is broadly embraced:  half of the population rated the level of 
its belief in ethnic oneness as a seven (out of seven), and another 32 percent embraced the ethnic 
oneness orientation at the five-to-six level. This majority embraces of mixing or fusion ideology 
coincides with its popularity across most of the Americas, except for the U.S., as we discuss 
below. 
 
Figure 3.2: 
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Next, we explore whether Jamaicans acknowledge the role of racial discrimination in 
generating the dramatic ethno-racial gaps in socio-economic well-being that we presented in 
Figure 3.2 above.  Table 3.1 shows that on the one hand, over two-thirds of Jamaicans claim that 
racial discrimination it is an important element in structuring poverty, including about 43% who 
claim it is ‘very important’ and 30% who claim it is ‘somewhat important.’ On the other hand, 
twenty-three percent of Jamaicans do not believe that race plays an important role in structuring 
poverty.  These results are somewhat counterintuitive to group conflict theory (Bobo 1988; Bobo 
et al. 2012), as we address in our Discussion.  
How might the Jamaican ideology of ethnic oneness align with the recognition of racial 
discrimination in Jamaican?  We begin in Table 3.2 with a cross-tabulation of these two 
measures.  The results show that the opinion that racial discrimination is ‘very important’ for 
explaining poverty is the highest scoring response at all levels of belief in the ethnic oneness 
perspective.  That relationship, however, appears most ambiguous at the ‘medium’ level and 
most robust at the ‘low’ level of ethnic oneness.  Regarding the latter, fully 56 percent of those 
who show little support for the idea of ethnic oneness opine that racial discrimination is ‘very 
important’ for explaining poverty in Jamaica.  
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Moving to an analytic perspective, Table 3.3 presents the relative risk ratios from a 
maximum likelihood multinomial logistic regression analysis, modelling predictors of the level 
of importance that Jamaicans give to racial discrimination for explaining poverty.  The table 
presents the likelihood of choosing the response option ‘very important’ compared to ‘not 
important.’15  Our results from model 1 (first column) show that those respondents who reported 
a lower sense of ethnic oneness are more likely to view racial discrimination as a very important 
factor in explaining poverty compared to those embracing ethnic oneness at the highest level 
(reference category).  More precisely, the odds of believing that race or color discrimination is 
‘very important’ for explaining poverty, versus ‘not important’, were 54 percent higher for 
individuals who expressed a low level of belief in ethnic oneness than those expressing a high-
level belief.  
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Ethnic Oneness by Importance of Color/Race for Explaining Black Poverty 
 
Embrace of 
Ethnic 
Oneness 
Importance of Racial Discrimination 
 
 
 
 None Some Very Total 
 
Low 
 
24% 
(48) 
 
20% 
(40) 
 
56% 
(112) 
 
100% 
(200) 
 
Medium 
 
30% 
(109) 
 
34% 
(125) 
 
36% 
(132) 
 
100% 
(366) 
 
High 
 
28% 
(155) 
 
30% 
(169) 
 
42% 
(236) 
 
100% 
(560) 
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15 See Appendix D for full model comparisons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Relative Risk Ratios from Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses, Importance of 
Color/Race for Explaining Poverty, 2008 (N= 1,126) 
 Very Important  vs. Not Important 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ethnic Oneness       
   Low    1.532* 1.545* 1.544* 1.550* 1.554* 1.552* 
 
   Medium  .795 .796 .792 .792 .780 .783 
 
   High - - - - - - 
 
Black   .896 .892 .891 .894 .890 
 
Female    1.082 1.083 1.076 1.082 
 
Age    1.001 1.001 1.001 
 
Urban area      2.524*** 2.518*** 
 
Years of education      .997 
Source: Americas Barometer, Jamaica 2008. 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤ .01, *p≤ .05 
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Models 2 through 6 systematically add variables to better evaluate possible mediating 
effects.  Several important patterns come to light.  Firstly, most of the demographic variables are 
not significantly related to the belief that racial discrimination is a very important factor in 
poverty. In addition, it is interesting to note the lack of any robust mediating effect of any of 
these variables on the relationship between ethnic oneness and a denial of racial discrimination; 
i.e., adding these variables to the models had virtually no effect on the size of the relative risk 
ratios for the association of ethnic oneness with a denial of racial discrimination.  
The finding that education level does not significantly structure attitudes regarding racial 
discrimination contrasts the evidence of robust educational divides on denials of discrimination 
in several contexts of Ibero-America (Telles and Bailey 2013).  Moreover, the lack of a 
significant race effect may be more surprising. In societies of robust ethno-racial hierarchy, 
group conflict theorists find that racial divides generally structure beliefs about racial 
stratification, as in the illustrative U.S. case (Bobo et al. 2012).   
 The only significant relationship among the demographic variables to the recognition of 
racial discrimination in Jamaica is urban residence. Individuals living in urban settings are 2.5 
times more likely than those in rural areas to think that racial discrimination is a very important 
cause of poverty, holding all other variables constant. This effect suggests urbanicity as a central 
cleavage for understanding Jamaicans' racial attitudes, to which we return below. As presented in 
Table 3.1, forty percent of Jamaicans live in urban areas according to the 2001 Census. Figure 
3.1, second panel, revealed that blacks are the least urban; about 51 percent of that population 
having urban residence; Chinese and white Jamaicans are the most urban, at 85 and 79 percent of 
their populations, respectively.  
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DISCUSSION 
We began this study asking whether, amid a stark ethno-racial hierarchy; Jamaicans 
embrace a mixing ideology labelled 'ethnic oneness' and recognize racial discrimination.  In 
particular, we wanted to know how that mixing ideology might affect Jamaicans’ views about 
the relationship between racial discrimination and poverty.  The importance of these questions is 
hard to overstate due to: (1) the long-existing social inequality along ethno-racial lines in 
Jamaica, and (2) the argument by a group of scholars that ideologies of mixing or ethnic fusion 
perpetuate contemporary social inequality (Bonilla-Silva and Glover 2005; Warren and Sue 
2011; Winant 1999). As noted, that scholarship has mostly studied countries of Ibero-America, 
but not those of Anglo colonial heritage.  Do New World countries of Anglo colonial heritage 
differ in terms of their public’s recognition of racial discrimination, the salience of mixing 
ideologies, and the relationship between them? Our analysis of data from Anglo-American 
Jamaica suggests four core findings: (1) socio-economic well-being is starkly structured by 
ethno-racial hierarchy; (2) nonetheless, a majority of Jamaicans embrace a core element of an 
ethnic oneness ideology; (3) a large majority of Jamaicans also point to the significance of racial 
discrimination in explaining inequality; and (4) the embrace of ethnic oneness is negatively 
associated with the belief that racial discrimination causes poverty.   
At first glance, our result suggesting a broad acceptance of a mixing ideology fits the 
Ibero-American pattern (Telles and Garcia 2013).  In addition, our finding on a widespread belief 
in the role of race in structuring social inequality in Jamaica also fits the Ibero-American pattern 
(Bailey 2009; Bailey et al. 2016; Telles and Bailey 2013).  Nonetheless, the specific negative 
effect of the ethnic oneness ideology on explaining poverty through racial discrimination is 
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novel; it suggests discordance with quantitative research on public opinion in Ibero-America 
(Bailey 2009; Telles and Bailey 2013).  
This contrast between Jamaica and much of Ibero-America may suggest the relevance of 
an Anglo-Ibero American divide on the effects of mixing ideologies, though much more research 
is needed.  Do we know anything about other Anglo-American cases to further explore a possible 
Ibero-Anglo divide?  We do to some limited extent: the U.S. case.  In relation to the U.S. case, 
our findings on Jamaica suggest some differences as well as commonalities regarding mixing 
ideologies and a recognition of racial discrimination.    
Regarding the salience of a mixing ideology in the U.S., there is no quantitative study to 
reference, to our knowledge. Nonetheless, some scholars suggest the negativity of ideologies of 
racial mixing and/or national fusion for the recognition of racial discrimination in the U.S. 
(Bonilla-Silva and Grover 2008; Hernandez 2016). If the assumptions in the limited literature on 
the U.S. case are accurate, the U.S. and Jamaica appear similar in terms of the effects of mixing 
ideologies on recognitions of racial discrimination.  
In terms of other hypothesized determinants of the recognition of racial discrimination in 
general in the U.S., research finds little or no class effects (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 
2000).  Similarly, in Jamaica we found that class (approximated by education) was not 
significantly related to the recognition of racial discrimination.16 Hence, both the Jamaican and 
U.S. cases strongly contrast with Ibero-America regarding the role of social class; in Ibero-
America, scholarship demonstrates that class is a central factor structuring the recognition of 
racial discrimination (Bailey 2009; Sidanius et al. 2001; Telles and Bailey 2013). Thus, we note 
some consonance between the U.S. and Jamaican Anglo-American cases.   
                                                          
16 We also ran our model on the subsample of Afro-Jamaicans and again found no significant education effect.   
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Nonetheless, Jamaica importantly differs from the U.S. regarding the very salience of 
recognition of racial discrimination as structuring social disadvantage.  In the U.S., public 
opinion research shows that only a minority of that country’s population views racial inequality 
as resulting from racial discrimination (Bobo et al., 2012). This is not the case in Jamaica, where 
a clear majority of general population believes that racial discrimination structures Jamaica’s 
poverty.  
What is more, regarding the determinants of recognition of racial discrimination, in the 
U.S., the core cleavage is race itself (Bobo 1988; Bobo et al. 2012).  This is explained in part by 
a key assumption in U.S. race relations scholarship that blacks and whites view the world from 
very different lenses (Dawson 2000; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Our analyses, however, did not 
demonstrate a race effect in Jamaica. Instead, this lack of a race effect in Jamaica is similar to 
what has been found in many countries of Ibero-America (Bailey 2009; Telles and Bailey 2013). 
Our results on the effect of race on public opinion in Jamaica, though, should be interpreted 
cautiously due to the skewed percent distribution of Jamaica's ethno-racial composition, at 90% 
black.  This is specifically problematic for smaller samples.    
Overall, the strongest population cleavage we found affecting the recognition of racial 
discrimination in Jamaica, however, was urban (41%) versus rural (59%) residence. Why might 
spatial location be so strong in determining affecting recognitions of racial discrimination in 
Jamaica?  One suggestion might be found in the historic rural and urban divide among slaves and 
free coloreds in colonial times that we noted above. Free coloreds were excluded from planation 
work during slavery, and hence much of that population was uniquely important as a formative 
element in nascent urbanization in Jamaica. This dynamic may have created one early 
segregating structure among Afro-Jamaicans, between urban areas (free coloreds) and rural ones 
78 
 
(Negro slaves).  Also, in post-abolition Jamaica, a substantial segment of Afro-Jamaicans 
working on the outskirts of plantations rapidly moved from rural (plantation) areas into new 
urban spaces, again creating distance from rural Afro-Jamaicans. These two structural dynamics 
could support the idea of contrasting racial lenses formed around urbanicity that is suggested in 
our findings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, our findings support continued but cautious scrutiny of the Ibero-Anglo 
American divide for understanding contemporary beliefs about racial discrimination and the 
effects of myths of racial mixing or ethnic fusion.  A colonial lens on ethno-racial dynamics has 
been central to the literature for decades. Scholars have posited the importance of numerous 
factors that may have at times appeared structured by colonial cleavages, including: ethno-racial 
composition, religion, sex composition, anti-miscegenation laws, systems of slavery, date of 
slavery’s abolition, and influence of U.S. black nationalism and black social movement activism 
(Banton 2012; de la Fuente 2010, 2015; Harris 1964; Hoetink 1967; Stamatov 2015; Tannebaum 
1947).  The exact specification of the operative colonial mechanisms that may structure 
contemporary Ibero-Anglo American divides regarding the effects of ideologies of racial mixing 
is beyond the scope of this analysis.  However, as is always the case in robust theory building, 
the usefulness of that colonial lens is an empirical question and our results from Jamaica provide 
leverage for further study.  
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CHAPTER 417 
Race, Skin Color, and Social Inequality in Jamaica 
Through nation building, race and skin color inequality in Jamaica became subsumed 
under class differences despite the historical and continued presence of a race and skin color 
hierarchy. This non-racial framing operates on the island in the form of loose racial 
categorizations and colloquial skin color designations. Additionally, there has been little 
quantitative research on racial inequality in Jamaica. Considering these factors, I ask, what does 
socioeconomic well-being along categorical race and skin color look like in such a context? 
More specifically, I ask, how are: (1) the availability of basic household amenities, (2) household 
income per capita, (3) educational attainment, and (4) household crowdedness structured along 
racial and skin color lines? As noted, before, Jamaica is a relatively poor country, thus basic 
household amenities are used in addition to conventional measures of inequality, income and 
education, to determine socioeconomic well-being. The added measure of basic household 
amenities represents the standard in which individuals live.  As such, understanding how 
categorical race and skin color shape ownership of these key assets provide crucial information 
on how these social characteristics influence inequality in Jamaica. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 This chapter of my dissertation is currently under review (received an R&R) at the Journal of Sociological 
Perspectives  
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DATA AND METHOD 
The data used to analyze race and skin color inequality are from the 2001 Jamaican 
Census, a 10% sample accessible at IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2015), 
and the 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) on 
Jamaica, also known as the Americas Barometer social survey (Americas Barometer 2010; 2012; 
2014). Vanderbilt University (home to the LAPOP) and the Center for Leadership and 
Governance of the University of West Indies at Mona conducted these social surveys. The 
project used a national probability sample design of voting age adults. The full sample is 
comprised of 1504, 1501, and 1506 respondents in face-to-face interviews conducted in English, 
respectively. The surveys used a complex sample design, considering stratification and 
clustering. The samples consist of four strata representing the four main geographical regions: 
the Kingston metropolitan region, Surrey, Middlesex, and Cornwall. Each stratum was further 
sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53 
percentage points.  
Outcome Measures  
Socioeconomic well-being and educational attainment were the core dependent variables 
used in analyses of this study. There were three measures of socioeconomic well-being: 
availability of basic household amenities (BHA), household income per person capita (HIPC), 
and household crowdedness.  
For BHA, the Americas Barometer social survey 2010 to 2014, respondents were asked; 
“Could you tell me if you have the following in your house.” The items used were: television, 
refrigerator, cellular telephone, vehicle/car (how many), washing machine, microwave oven, 
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indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, computer, and internet. These survey items each had a 
maximum score of 1, indicating that they indeed possessed the item in their home; except for 
‘vehicle/car’ which had a maximum score of 3 (having 3 or more cars). A composite score, 
‘amenities’, was created by adding numeric responses of the ten items, thus giving the variable a 
range of 0 to 12. A composite score was similarly calculated for the 2001 Jamaican census. This 
was based on whether the sample had: electricity, water supply, access to a sewage system, 
cellphone, internet, computer, kitchen, bath, and toilet. If survey item responses were non-
dichotomous, they were recoded so that lack of access was coded as 0 and all other responses, 1. 
Composite score, also labelled amenities, ranged from 0 to 8. In both cases, higher scores were 
indicative of possessing more BHA.  
 The second measure of socioeconomic well-being, HIPC, was calculated by taking the 
log of the quotient of the household income by the number of persons living in the household at 
time of data collection18. Specific items were:  
“Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this 
household fit, including remittances from aboard and the income of all the 
working adults and children?” and “How many people in total live in this 
household at this time?” 
In treating the variable household income (interval data) as a continuous variable more 
rigorously, I converted each interval to its midpoint value.19  
  The third socioeconomic well-being measure, household crowdedness, was only used for 
the analysis of census data (survey items not present in LAPOP data) and represented the number 
of persons living in the household per bedroom. This variable had a maximum score of 13. I 
                                                          
18 In the 2010 LAPOP data, ‘how many people live in this household at this time?’ was not asked, thus, ‘the number 
of children living in household presently’ was used. 
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posit that these items effectively capture a core element of socioeconomic well-being. Examining 
the availability of basic household amenities and household crowdedness paints a fuller picture 
of how and in what condition individuals live. This is something that simply investigating 
individual or household income cannot provide. Additionally, educational attainment was 
captured by a continuous variable representing the number of years of schooling respondents 
completed.  
Independent Variables: Categorical Race and Skin color 
Respondents were asked to report their ethno-racial status in one of the following 
categories:  black, white, East Indian, Chinese, mixed, or other.  Due to small sample sizes in 
non-black categories, responses were coded as black (reference category), mixed, and other 
(10%).20 For the LAPOP 2010, 2012, and 2014 data, it was observed that an average of 87.4% of 
the sample self-identified as black, 10% as mixed, and 2.6% as other.  Due to the larger sample 
size of the 2001 census data, racial categories were kept the same and not recoded.  
For the LAPOP datasets, interviewers were asked to collect skin color information of 
respondents. The color palette used ranged from very light (1) to very dark (11)21. Again, skin 
color was used in conjunction with race as explanatory variables because the imposition or direct 
transference of U.S. racial categories on such societies located in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is not always relevant when race is not necessarily similarly conceptualized. 
Additionally, being a majority Afro-descent society, it is imperative to use skin color in assessing 
social inequality as solely using race would not fully capture the existing disparity.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 See Bailey et. al. 2014. 
20 The specific question asked in the LAPOP 2010-14 questionnaires was: ‘Do you consider yourself black, Indian, 
white, Chinese, mixed or of another race?’  
21 Only used in analyses of LAPOP data as the census does not collect skin color data. 
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Control Variables 
Models include controls for various socio-demographic factors: respondent’s sex, age, 
ethno-racial status, years of schooling, household income per person capita, and urbanicity. 
Respondent’s sex was measured by a dummy variable (1 = male, 0 = female). Respondents’ age 
was measured as a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 96 for LAPOP data and 0 to 98 for the 
Jamaican census. A dummy variable was used to capture location/area (0 = ‘rural’, 1 = ‘urban’).  
An area was considered urban if it had a population of 2,000 or more persons and provided 
several amenities and facilities indicative of modern living in Jamaica. Years of schooling and 
household income per person capita (specified previously) were only used as control variables 
for models when not used as outcome variables. 
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Table 4.1. Mean and Standard Error for Variables Used in Study, LAPOP 
 
Variables Range  Mean (Std. Err.) 
  Years 
  2010 2012 2014 
Skin color 1-11 7.368 
(.072) 
 
7.025 
(.091) 
7.160 
(.055) 
Male 0-1 .412 
(.019) 
 
.560 
(.028) 
.505 
(.016) 
Age 18-9522 44.409 
(.484) 
 
37.614 
(.714) 
39.894 
(.487) 
Years of Education 0-17 10 
(.119) 
 
11.816 
(.153) 
10.248 
(.099) 
Household Income per Person 
Capita23 
5-1324 9.483 
(.049) 
 
9.644 
(.061) 
9.073 
(.037) 
Location in an Urban area  .520 
(.019) 
 
.715 
(.025) 
.592 
(.016) 
Amenities Available25 0-12 6.059 
(.103) 
 
8.728 
(.101) 
6.390 
(.087) 
No. of Observations  663 31626 959 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Maximum age differed for each year; ranging from 90 – 95 years.  
23 This variable was created by logging the quotient of household income by the number of persons in the household 
at the time of data collection. However, for 2010 this information was not available, so the number of children 
living in household was used.  
24 The ranges of household income per person capita for 2010, 2012, and 2014 are: 5.7745 – 12.612, 5.704 – 12.401, 
and 5.367 – 12.150, respectively. 
25 Composite score of whether or not sample had: television, refrigerator, cellphone, cars, microwave, indoor 
plumbing, indoor bathroom, washing machine, computer, or internet. Each had a maximum score of 1, except for 
cars which had a maximum score of 3. 
26 Data for 2012 was a split ballot thus the substantial lower N. 
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Analytical Approach 
I conducted multiple regression analyses of the relationship between race and skin color 
on socioeconomic well-being and educational attainment using the full sample from the 2010, 
2012, and 2014 Americas Barometer social survey, as well as the 2001 Jamaican Census27. For 
analyses using LAPOP data, I present six models for each year (Tables 3, 4, and 5). The first 
model includes the race variable, with the second model adding controls. The third model 
included the skin color variable, with the fourth adding controls. The fifth model included both 
the race and skin color variables, with the sixth model adding controls. In Table 6, I present 
results for analyses using the 2001 Jamaican Census data. Of the two models, the first presented 
included race with the second adding controls. 
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Source: Original data from the national statistical office of Jamaica and accessed through IPUMS International. 
Means and standard errors (in parentheses) rounded to three (3) decimal places. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 The 2001 Jamaican census did not have skin color data.  
28 Composite score of whether or not sample had: electricity, water supply, access to a sewage system, cellphone, 
internet, computer, kitchen, bath, and toilet. 
Table 4.2. Mean and Standard Error for Variables Used from 2001 
Jamaican Census 
 
Variables 
  
Range  Mean 
 (Std. Err.) 
 
Male 0-1 .491 
(.001) 
 
Age 0-98 28.112 
(.050) 
 
Years of Education 0-21 20.431 
(.070) 
 
Household Income per Person Capita 6.818 – 16.118 13.633 
(.004) 
 
Location in an Urban area 0-1 .490 
(.001) 
 
Over-Crowdedness  2.313 
(.003) 
 
Amenities Available28 0-8 5.196 
(.002) 
 
No. of Observations 177,217 
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RESULTS 
 Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present descriptive statistics for each year of Americas Barometer data 
used and the 2001 Jamaican census, respectively. For the LAPOP data, the racial composition of 
the sample across the three years was approximately: 86 - 88% black, 0.07% Chinese29, 9 - 11% 
mixed, 1.3 - 2.7% East Indian, 0.1 - 0.3% white, 0.2 - 0.5% other, and 0.3% as unknown. For the 
purposes of analyses, racial/ethnic categories of East Indian, white, other, and unknown were 
grouped together and labelled 'other', which represented 0.3 - 1% of the Americas Barometer 
sample. For the census, however, the racial composition was: 91.6% black, 0.2% Chinese, 6.2% 
mixed, 0.9% East Indian, 0.2% white, 0.1% other, and 0.8% unknown30. The average skin color 
of the LAPOP sample was 7, on a scale of 1 to 11.  
 Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between race 
and skin color and multiple factors of socioeconomic well-being and education. Table 4.3 
presents analyses results of the before mentioned outcome variables and household crowdedness 
using the 2001 Jamaican Census. While tables 4.4 to 4.6 summarize the analyses results on race 
(black omitted because it is the reference category) and skin color on the number of BHA, HIPC, 
and years of education using 2010, 2012, and 2014 LAPOP data.  
2001 Jamaican Census 
First, I turn to the results of the 2001 Census showing the probability of household 
crowdedness, BHA, years of schooling, and HIPC as predicted by racial self-classification 
(Table 4.3). A more nuanced perspective was applied to this set of models as there was no need 
to cluster racial categories due to larger sample size. Results for BHA, years of schooling, and 
                                                          
29 Same for 2012 and 2014; this racial group was not listed for 2010. 
88 
 
HIPC shows that those who racially self-classified as nonblack had significantly more when 
compared to black Jamaicans. Substantial differences were observed in the average number of 
BHA and years of schooling white and Chinese Jamaicans possessed in comparison to their 
black counterparts.  
White and Chinese Jamaicans had an average of up to 5 and 7 more years of schooling 
than blacks, respectively. This is interesting to note, as the number of whites and Chinese in the 
10% census sample does not exceed 0.2% as compared to 91.6% of blacks. Kelly and Bailey 
(2018) also illustrate this severe disparity in education; they found that of Jamaican aged 25-65 
years, 40.7% white and 13.9% Chinese Jamaicans had completed university level education as 
compared to only 2.4% of Afro-Jamaicans. Whites and Chinese also had significantly more 
HIPC than blacks, with whites having the highest: 0.5 (model 1) and 0.7 (model 2, with control 
variables). This contrasts Bailey and colleagues (2014) who noted that is the U.S., Asian-
Americans have the highest household income per capita, despite having an average skin color 
darker than self-identified whites. When examining household crowdedness, all racial groups 
were less likely to experience this than blacks. On average, Chinese experienced 37%, mixed 
11%, East Indians 20%, whites 47%, and other 20% less household crowdedness in comparison 
to blacks (model 1).  
Even when controlling for household income per capita and education, the effects of 
categorical race in structuring household crowdedness was still highly salient. These findings 
illustrate that race does matter in the Jamaican context. Black or Afro-Jamaicans are dramatically 
disadvantaged compared to other racial groups in Jamaica despite controlling for socioeconomic 
status via household income and education. While, this may not be a surprising finding as similar 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30 2001 Jamaican census: http://statinja.gov.jm/popcensus/tables.aspx. The unknown category was dropped from 
analyses. 
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results are noted in the U.S. (Conley 1999; Fryer et al. 2013; Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver 
and Shapiro 2006; Pager 2003). However, what is important here is establishing that categorical 
race does matter in a society labelled as racially homogeneous. Furthermore, as stated 
previously, race is multidimensional, and each dimension may offer differential findings in 
relation to outcomes of inequality. While it is seen that racial inequality as measured by racial 
self-classification reveal similar patterns in social inequality as the U.S., race defined as 
phenotype, specifically, skin color, may reveal different findings. Therefore, I now turn to the 
results of the Americas Barometer, which uses race as both racial self-classification and skin 
color. 
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Table 4.3. OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Over-crowdedness, Availability of Basic Household 
Amenities, Years of Schooling, and Household Income per Person Capita by Race, 2001 Jamaican Census 
 Over-Crowdedness  Amenities  Years of Schooling  Household Income per 
Person Capita 
 
Race (reference = 
black) 
 
           
      Chinese -.876*** 
(.075) 
-.523*** 
(.071) 
 
 1.279*** 
(.077) 
.908*** 
(.071) 
 4.103** 
(1.602) 
7.089*** 
(1.557) 
 
 .364*** 
(.099) 
.461*** 
(.097) 
 
      Mixed -.246*** 
(.013) 
-.234*** 
(.012) 
 
 .373*** 
(.013) 
.331*** 
(.012) 
 1.442*** 
(.280) 
1.176*** 
(.272) 
 .169*** 
(.017) 
.146*** 
(017) 
      East Indian -.479*** 
(.033) 
-.233*** 
(.031) 
 
 .525*** 
(.034) 
.477*** 
(.032) 
 -2.909*** 
(.713) 
.368 
(693) 
 .016 
(.044) 
.161*** 
(.043) 
      white -1.104*** 
(.082) 
-.656*** 
(.077) 
 
 1.495*** 
(.084) 
1.204*** 
(.077) 
 1.339 
(1.736) 
5.574*** 
(1.684) 
 .538*** 
(.107) 
.706*** 
(.105) 
      other -.467*** 
(.105) 
-.300** 
(.099) 
 
 .943*** 
(.108) 
.873*** 
(.100) 
 .552 
(2.245) 
3.065 
(2.176) 
 -.198 
(.138) 
-.097 
(.136) 
Male - -.162*** 
(.006) 
 
 - -.105*** 
(.006) 
 - .516*** 
(.137) 
 - -.268*** 
(.008) 
Age - -.021*** 
(.000) 
 
 - .001*** 
(.000) 
 - -.304*** 
(.003) 
 - -.012*** 
(.000) 
Years of Schooling - .001*** 
(.000) 
 
 - -.0002* 
(.000) 
 - -  - .005*** 
(.000) 
Household Income per 
Capita 
- -.093*** 
(.002) 
 
 - -.017*** 
(.002) 
 - 1.187*** 
(.038) 
 - - 
Location in Urban area - -.154*** 
(.006) 
 
 - 1.081*** 
(.006) 
 - .824*** 
(.137) 
 - .135*** 
(.008) 
Constant 2.339 
(.003) 
 
4.489 
(.026) 
 5.160 
(.004) 
3.816 
(.027) 
 20.350 
(.074) 
12.004 
(.554) 
 13.620 
(.005) 
13.932 
(.010) 
            
R-squared .005 .117  .009 .153  .001 .058  .001 .038 
Adjusted R-squared .005 .117  .009 .153  .001 .058  .001 .037 
No. of obs 177,217   177,662 
Source:  Original data from national statistical office of Jamaica and accessed through IPUMS International. 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤ .01, *p≤ .05 
Note: All regression coefficients rounded to three (3) decimal places with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Americas Barometer: Availability of Basic Household Amenities (BHA)  
For 2010, 2012, and 2014, model 1 of Table 4.4 is a multiple regression with race as a 
predictor of BHA. For all three years, race is positively and significantly correlated with BHA. 
This means that in comparisons to blacks, individuals who self-identified as mixed or other were 
likely to possess more BHA. More specifically, in 2010 blacks possessed a mean of 6 or owned 
50% of the 12 BHA examined in study. However, individuals who racial identified as mixed or 
other had 13% and 15% more BHA, respectively. Looking at model 1 for 2012, we get a 
constant of 8.7, indicating that the average number of BHA for black was 8.7 or approximately 
73%. Coefficients for those who self-identified as mixed or other are significant; their mean 
number of BHA available is significantly different from those of blacks. These individuals had 
9% and 15% more BHA than blacks on average. The same basic trend is found for 2014 with 
those who are mixed and other possessing, on average, 8% and 17% more BHA than blacks, 
respectively. 
 For model 2 of Table 4.4, control variables were added and, except for mixed race 
individuals in 2010, race was again positively associated with the availability of BHA. The mean 
in model 3 for 2010, 2012, and 2014 is 8.4, 10.8, and 8.8 (respectively), indicating the average 
number of BHA held by the sample. For the variable skin color (higher numbers signified darker 
skin colors) coefficients were significant and negative. This indicates that when accounting for 
skin color, those of the sample with darker skin colors had less BHA than their lighter-skinned 
counterparts. Therefore, for every unit increase in skin color, there is, on average, 2% to 4% less 
BHA. Even with the addition of control variables to the model (see Table 4.4, model 4), skin 
color remained significantly and negatively associated with BHA. When examining both race 
and skin color as predictors of BHA, race remained positively associated while skin color was 
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negatively associated. Skin color is significantly associated with BHA over all three years; only 
in 2014 is race significant (in the comparison of blacks to others). Therefore, in 2010 and 2012, 
skin color was a more significant predictor of BHA rather than race even when control variables 
were added to model (see model 6 for each year). 
For models 2, 4, and 6 of all three years, for which the control variables of: sex, age, 
years of schooling, HIPC, and location in urban area were added; all, except sex in 2014, were 
significantly and positively associated with BHA. For example, in 2012, on average, males 
possessed at most 32% more BHA than females. Additionally, those who were older and had 
more years of schooling also possessed more BHA than those who were younger and had less 
years of schooling. Specifically, for each unit increase in age and years of schooling, there was 
an average increase of 2% and 26% in BHA, respectively. Also, for every increment change in 
household income per person capita, BHA available increased by 40% to 171% on average. 
Additionally, those that lived in an urban area had 37% to 176% more BHA than those who lived 
in a rural setting (larger end of percentage range observed in model 2 of 2012).  
Looking at the R-squared, or amount of variation in the data explained by the models, 
model 4 explains the variation in the data the best. Approximately 48% in 2010 (R2 = 0.48, F [6, 
656 = 101.10, p<.001), 36% (R2 = 0.364, F [6, 309] = 29.42, p<.001), and 29% (R2 = 0.285, F 
[6, 952] = 64.64, p<.001) of the variation in the data was explained by skin color and control 
variables used. In model 6, where both race and skin color were used as predictors along with 
control variables, race did little in way of adding to the amount of variation explained. Therefore, 
this suggests that skin color has more explanatory power in predicting BHA than race.  
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Table 4.4. OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Availability Basic Amenities by Categorical Race and 
Skin Color,  
LAPOP 2010-14 
 Year  
 2010 2012 2014 
Constant 6.003 
(.074) 
-7.917 
(.661) 
8.377 
 (.266) 
-6.477 
(.772) 
8.266 
 (.295) 
-6.423 
(.773) 
8.664 
(.077) 
-.372 
(.763) 
10.837  
(.292) 
1.522 
(.906) 
10.559 
(.335) 
1.271 
(.932) 
6.326 
(.072) 
-3.789 
(.621) 
8.847 
(.284) 
-2.175 
(.758) 
8.649 
(.307) 
-2.259 
(.767) 
Race (reference = 
black) 
                  
mixed .778*** 
(.235) 
-.194 
(.300) 
 
  .201 
(.241) 
-.444 
(.305) 
.787*** 
(.204) 
.536* 
(.238) 
  .296  
(.216) 
.274 
(.250) 
.733** 
(.236) 
.180 
(.250) 
  .201 
(.241) 
-.039 
(.257) 
other .857* 
(.387) 
.044 
(.495) 
 
  .165 
(.390) 
-.199 
(.495) 
1.252**  
(.500) 
.823 
(.664) 
  .653 
 (.497) 
.637 
(.659) 
1.535*** 
(.442) 
1.189** 
(.463) 
  .956* 
(.440) 
.927* 
(.467) 
Skin color   -.314*** 
(.036) 
 
-.143*** 
(.042) 
-.302*** 
(.038) 
-.159*** 
(.044) 
  -.296*** 
(.041) 
-.196*** 
(.053) 
-.263*** 
(.045) 
-.171** 
(.057) 
  -.337** 
(.039) 
-.171*** 
(.045) 
-.316*** 
(.041) 
-.159*** 
(.047) 
Male  .202 
(.157) 
 
 .307* 
(.158) 
 .301 
(.158) 
 .415** 
(.168) 
 .485** 
(.167) 
 .484** 
(.167) 
 -.040 
(.150) 
 .067 
(.152) 
 .068 
(.153) 
Age  .044*** 
(.006) 
 
 .044*** 
(.006) 
 .044*** 
(.006) 
 .027*** 
(.007) 
 .028*** 
(.007) 
 .028*** 
(.007) 
 .004 
(.005) 
 .004 
(.005) 
 .004 
(.005) 
Years of Schooling  .254*** 
(.029) 
 
 .245*** 
(.029) 
 .247*** 
(.029) 
 .096** 
(.037) 
 .085* 
(.037) 
 .083* 
(.037) 
 .240*** 
(.028) 
 .227*** 
(.028) 
 .227*** 
(.028) 
Household Income 
per Person Captia 
 
 .942*** 
(.068) 
 .907*** 
(.068) 
 .912*** 
(.068) 
 .637*** 
(.092) 
 .605*** 
(.091) 
 .611*** 
(.091) 
 .804*** 
(.071) 
 .780*** 
(.071) 
 .779*** 
(.071) 
Location in Urban 
area 
 .912*** 
(.155) 
 
 .884*** 
(.154) 
 .896*** 
(.154) 
 .657*** 
(.185) 
 .565** 
(.185) 
 .571** 
(.185) 
 .398** 
(.152) 
 .334* 
(.153) 
 .339* 
(.153) 
R-squared .010 .472 .049 .480 .050 .482 .033 .349 .082 .364 .087 .368 .014 .284 .049 .290 .052 .293 
Adjusted R-
squared 
.009 .466 .049 .476 .048 .476 .030 .334 .080 .351 .082 .351 .012 .279 .048 .285 .050 .287 
No. of obs 1,504 663     583 316     1,489 959     
Source: Americas Barometer, Jamaica 2010, 2012, and 2014. 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤ .01, *p≤ .05 
Note: All regression coefficients rounded to three (3) decimal places with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Years of Schooling 
On average, those individuals who identified as mixed or other had more years of 
schooling than those who racially self-identified as black. However, only the mean comparisons 
between blacks and mixed were significant across all models and years. When examining race 
solely as a predictor of years of schooling, results showed that those identified as mixed had an 
average of 1.6 (2010), 0.7 (2012), and 1 (2014) more years of schooling than blacks. These 
results were similar when examining skin color as a predictor of educational level; those who 
were darker-skinned had less years of schooling than lighter-skinned individuals. That is, for 
every unit increase in the skin color variable (meaning, the darker one was) there was a 0.3 (2010 
and 2012) and 0.4 (2014) decrease in the years of schooling received. When both categorical 
race and skin color were used as predictors, only the comparison between mixed race and blacks 
remained significant (2010). Again, we see that while race is not significant when control 
variables were added to regression models, skin color continued to be significantly and 
negatively associated with years of schooling like that of BHA.  
This supports previous findings that while categorical race substantially shapes 
educational inequality (Telles et al. 2015), skin color has been found to be a stronger predictor of 
educational attainment (Monk 2014, 2016). All control variables were significantly associated 
with years of education except for sex in 2010. Overall, males and older individuals had lesser 
years of schooling when compared to their female and younger counterparts; while those 
individuals who had higher household income per person capita and lived in an urban setting had 
more years of schooling on average.  
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Table 4.5. OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Years of Schooling by Categorical Race and Skin Color, 
LAPOP 2010-14 
 Year  
 2010 2012 2014 
Constant 9.882 
(.086) 
3.352 
(.874) 
12.413 
 (.313) 
4.347 
(1.027) 
12.023 
 (.345) 
4.26 
(1.029) 
10.156 
(.082) 
5.297 
(.603) 
12.763  
(.045) 
6.619 
(.759) 
12.846 
(.374) 
6.687 
(.785) 
10.132 
(.082) 
4.643 
(.700) 
12.970 
 (.324) 
6.942 
(.840) 
12.793 
 (.352) 
6.758 
(.853) 
Race (reference = 
black) 
                  
mixed 1.590*** 
(.272) 
.730 
(.400) 
 
  1.045*** 
(.281) 
.572 
(.410) 
.672** 
(.243) 
.128 
(.242) 
  .043  
(.253) 
-.096 
(.255) 
1.016*** 
(.270) 
.693* 
(.288) 
  .390 
(.277) 
.366 
(.296) 
other .378 
(.448) 
.510  
(.661) 
 
  -.277 
(.454) 
.357 
(.667) 
-.460  
(.591) 
.281 
(.532) 
  -1.118 
 (.587) 
.048 
(.537) 
.757 
(.506) 
.570 
(.535) 
  .094 
(.504) 
.184 
(.538) 
Skin shade   -.327*** 
(.042) 
 
-.120* 
(.057) 
-.286*** 
(.045) 
-.098 
(.059) 
  -.348*** 
(.045) 
-.131** 
(.046) 
-.357*** 
(.049) 
-.137** 
(.050) 
  -.381*** 
(.044) 
 
-.248*** 
(.051) 
-.361*** 
(.047) 
-.229*** 
(.054) 
Male  -.366 
(.209) 
 
 -.312 
(.212) 
 -.304 
(.212) 
 -.626*** 
(.151) 
 -.567*** 
(.152) 
 -.563*** 
(.152) 
 -.454** 
(.173) 
 -.269 
(.175) 
 -.290 
(.176) 
Age  -.064*** 
(.008) 
 
 -.063*** 
(.008) 
 -.063*** 
(.008) 
 -.084*** 
(.005) 
 -.084*** 
(.005) 
 -.084*** 
(.005) 
 -.073*** 
(.006) 
 -.073*** 
(.006) 
 -.072*** 
(.006) 
Household Income 
per Person Capita 
 
 .981*** 
(.083) 
 .969*** 
(.083) 
 .958*** 
(.084) 
 .950*** 
(.065) 
 .912*** 
(.066) 
 .911*** 
(.067) 
 .926*** 
(.076) 
 .871*** 
(.076) 
 .871*** 
(.076) 
Location in Urban 
area 
 .541** 
(.206) 
 .547** 
(.206) 
 .529** 
(.206) 
 
 .339* 
(.156) 
 .257 
(.158) 
 .259 
(.159) 
 .458** 
(.175) 
 .368* 
(.175) 
 .366* 
(.175) 
R-squared .023 .284 .039 .285 .049 .287 .006 .383 .042 .389 .045 .389 .011 .263 .048 .276 .049 .277 
Adjusted R-
squared 
.021 .277 .039 .279 .047 .279 .005 .379 .041 .385 .043 .384 .009 .259 .047 .272 .047 .272 
No. of obs 1,498 663     1,350 883     1,495 963     
Source: Americas Barometer, Jamaica 2010, 2012, and 2014. 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤ .01, *p≤ .05 
Note: All regression coefficients rounded to three (3) decimal places with standard errors in parentheses.  
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Household Income per Person Capita (HIPC) 
In most countries, there is a relatively linear relationship between race, perceived skin 
color and household income per person capita: blacks or darker skin shades are associated with 
lower incomes more so than other non-black racial groups or lighter-skinned individuals (Bailey 
et al. 2014). Table 4.6 shows that in 2010 and 2014, non-blacks had higher amounts of HIPC 
when compared to blacks. Surprisingly, in 2012, it is observed that those who were racially 
categorized as other had significantly less HIPC than blacks (model 6).  It was not surprising 
however, that darker skin shades were associated with significantly lower amounts of HIPC for 
all three years; for every unit increase in skin shade, there was 0.1 to 0.2 less household income 
per person capita, on average. However, while race is shown to be significant in shaping income 
distribution (Bailey et al 2016), a caution here is that the relationship between race and 
household income per person capita is explained away by skin shade. Similarities between the 
U.S., Latin America, and Jamaica regarding the disadvantages of skin shade for income is also 
noted (Allen, et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 1998; Keith and Herring 1991; Seltzer and Smith 1991; 
Telles and Murguia 1990). 
Additionally, it was seen that being male was positively and significantly associated with 
HIPC, hence reflecting the gender gap in wages. As expected, older individuals and those with 
more years of schooling had more HIPC than their counterparts. For each unit increase in age 
and years of schooling, household income per person capita significantly increased between 0.3 
to 0.5 and 0.01 to 0.02, respectively. Individuals located in an urban setting also had significantly 
higher mean HIPC when compared to those living in rural areas. 
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Table 4.6. OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Household Income Per Capita by Categorical Race 
and Skin Color, LAPOP 2010-14 
 Year  
 2010 2012 2014 
Race (reference 
= black) 
 
                  
      mixed .587** 
(.189) 
.369* 
(.171) 
 
- - .397* 
(.194) 
.243 
(.175) 
.167 
(.121) 
.056 
(.112) 
- - -.193 
(.124) 
-.115 
(.117) 
.199 
(.125) 
.032 
(.114) 
- - .052 
(.127) 
-.068 
(.118) 
      other .322 
(.301) 
.298 
(.283) 
 
- - .138 
(.303) 
.176 
(.284) 
-.090 
(.264) 
-.330 
(.247) 
- - -.439 
(.258) 
-.497* 
(.247) 
.296 
(.234) 
.174 
(.212) 
- - .108 
(.235) 
.052 
(.214) 
Skin shade - - -.117*** 
(.026 
 
-.086*** 
(.024) 
-.102*** 
(.027) 
-.077** 
(.025) 
- - -.180 
(.021) 
-.091*** 
(.021) 
-.196*** 
(.023) 
-.104*** 
(.023) 
- - -.106*** 
(.021) 
-.071*** 
(.021) 
-.103*** 
(.022) 
-.073*** 
(.021) 
Male - .317*** 
(.089) 
 
- .359*** 
(.090) 
- .360*** 
(.090) 
- .400*** 
(.070) 
- .425*** 
(.069) 
- .432*** 
(.069) 
- .413*** 
(.067) 
- .454*** 
(.068) 
- .457*** 
(.068) 
Age - .005 
(.004) 
 
- .005 
(.004) 
- .005 
(.004) 
- .020*** 
(.003) 
- .019*** 
(.003) 
- .019*** 
(.003) 
- .014*** 
(.002) 
- .014*** 
(.002) 
- .014*** 
(.002) 
Years of 
Schooling 
- .180*** 
(.015) 
 
- .176*** 
(.015) 
- .174*** 
(.015) 
- .205*** 
(.014) 
- .195*** 
(.014) 
- .194*** 
(.014) 
- .145*** 
(.012) 
- .137*** 
(.012) 
- .138*** 
(.012) 
Location in 
Urban area 
- .254** 
(.088) 
 
- .251** 
(.088) 
- .243** 
(.088) 
- .333*** 
(.072) 
- .265*** 
(.073) 
- .264*** 
(.073) 
- .250*** 
(.069) 
- .220** 
(.069) 
- .221*** 
(.259) 
Constant 9.426 
(.051) 
7.180 
(.255) 
10.339 
(.196) 
7.856 
(.320) 
10.193 
(.210) 
7.798 
(.323) 
9.112 
(.041) 
5.695 
(.220) 
10.441 
(.159) 
6.546 
(.292) 
10.590 
(.176) 
6.654 
(.302) 
9.048 
(.040) 
6.654 
(.185) 
9.838 
(.157) 
7.256 
(.253) 
9.803 
(.168) 
7.276 
(.259) 
 
R-squared .016 .171 .030 .240 .036 .242 .002 .249 .067 .263 .072 .267 .004 .188 .025 .197 .026 .198 
Adjusted R-
squared 
.013 .164 .028 .234 .032 .234 .000 .244 .066 .259 .069 .261 .002 .183 .024 .193 .026 .192 
No. of 
obs 
672 663     997 883     967 963     
Source: Americas Barometer, Jamaica 2010, 2012, and 2014. 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤ .01, *p≤ .05 
Note: All regression coefficients rounded to three (3) decimal places with standard errors in parentheses.  
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DISCUSSION 
I began this study by asking if there is a race component in the stratification of social 
inequality in the perceived ethno-racial homogeneous society of Jamaica. Additionally, due to 
the racial homogeneity of the Jamaican context, I proposed a multidimensional approach for 
examining race defining race as self-classification and phenotype (skin color). Firstly, I find that 
categorical race does matter in the structuring of social inequality of Jamaica, as social inequality 
is starkly structured by both measures. Secondly, of the two distinct measures of race used in the 
study, skin color was found to more aptly capture patterns in inequality than racial self-
classification. Overall it was found that Blacks and darker-skinned individuals (regardless of 
racial category) have significantly lower levels of BHA, HIPC, and years of schooling, as well as 
experience more household crowdedness than their non-black and lighter-skinned Jamaican 
counterparts, even when accounting for standard social class proxies.  
These results point to the importance of accounting for the contextuality of race in 
inequality research. Examining skin color in addition to categorical race offered a more nuanced 
view on the structuring of social inequality that was simply not captured by utilizing racial self-
classification alone. This was particularly notable when comparing the results and predictability 
of categorical race when using the 2001 Jamaican census compared to the 2014 LAPOP on 
Jamaica, where skin color, an additive dimension of race, was able to be assessed. As Monk 
(2016) noted in his research on Brazil, race and color are often conflated in race-based inequality 
research, despite both revealing differential dimensions of individuals lived experience and 
outcomes: “They are not substitutable and do not refer to the “same underlying thing”” (p.425; 
see also Banton 2012).  
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Furthermore, these findings take on even more importance considering that official 
discourse in Jamaica has historically used a “color-blind” or “non-racial” frame in describing 
Jamaican population dynamics. The ideology of Jamaican Exceptionalism (Gray 1991; 
Vickerman 1999) downplays the relevance of race and skin color in accounting for social 
inequalities. The constructed ambiguity of race imparted upon Jamaicans by its nation building 
elites (Hall 1997; Henke 2001; Kelly and Bailey 2018) eventually served to replace a privileging 
of race without eradicating the privileging of lightness; as evidenced by extensive skin color 
epithets (Hall 1997; Henke 2001) used in the island. This shift in the racial imaginary could then 
be described as superficial, as a resoundingly similar stratification remains, but the means 
through which it may be articulated has been overwhelmingly complicated. By viewing this 
phenomenon through a lens of racial homogeneity, the nuances of representation within the 
country’s occupational sectors are functionally ignored.  
This belief is deeply ingrained in Jamaican society (Kelly and Bailey 2018), and the 
country lacks any race-based policies despite the urgings of the UN’s International Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (UN Doc. CERD/C/JAM/16-20). Since 
Jamaica is believed to be racially homogeneous as 91.6% of the population is of Afro-descent 
(according to 2001 census), the government may feel there is no need for race-based policies as 
the country’s population in and of itself dissuades racial inequality.  
However, as the findings of this study shows, income, education, and standard of living 
are structured along categorical race and skin color in the island. In order to contextualize these 
findings, there are particularities that merit note. As stated previously, whites who remained in 
Jamaica after the abolition of slavery still held control of property. In addition, Jews, Syrians, 
and Lebanese merchants had human capital on which to compound their social positions. Afro-
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Jamaicans on the other hand, rarely owned property or businesses, thus lacked prestige and 
financial wherewithal. This would no doubt influence the availability or ability to obtain certain 
household amenities. These results show a continuation of that disadvantage in contemporary 
Jamaican society. As Afro-Jamaicans had significantly less BHA than whites Jamaicans; this 
demonstrates not only the advantage of white racial group membership across the Americas (e.g., 
Bailey et al. 2014), but the disadvantages of blackness and membership in that racial group. This 
racial disparity hence largely represents the vestiges of slavery in the post-colonial context of 
Jamaica.  
Though, what seems to be more central to the study of racial inequality in Jamaica is skin 
color. Historically it was shown that lighter-skinned slaves received better jobs, diets, living 
conditions, etc. (Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007; Johnson 2004). This light skin privilege persists 
in contemporary society as previous research have shown intra-group stratification among whites 
(Hannon 2015), Latinos (Allen, Telles, and Hunter 2000; Hunter 2007; Roth 2010) and African 
Americans (Allen, Telles and Hunter 2000; Goldsmith, Hamilton, and Darity 2006; Hughes and 
Hertel 1990; Hunter 1998; Keith and Herring 1991; Monk, 2014; Seltzer and Smith 1991).  
Moreover, there has been research in Latin America that highlights the importance of 
skin color in structuring inequality across all individuals regardless of categorical race (Bailey et 
al. 2016; Bailey et al. 2013; Bailey et al. 2014; Telles 2014; Telles and Lim 1998). Skin color 
may have more purchase in racial stratification in Latin America due to ideologies of racial 
mixing or fusion. This ideology is also present in Jamaica as illustrated through its pluralist state 
motto (Out of many, one people). This racial pluralism coupled with Jamaica’s perceived racial 
homogeneity, may substantially account for the observed effects of skin color regardless of 
categorical racial groups. Moreover, findings indicate the importance of capturing skin color data 
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on the national census of Jamaica Therefore, there are similarities between the U.S., Latin 
America, and Jamaica regarding the disadvantages of skin color.  
It appears to be a shared characteristic and common theme of the Americas that darker-
skinned individuals, and most especially those of African ancestry, have lower income and fewer 
years of schooling than their lighter-skinned counterparts (Keith and Herring 1991; Seltzer and 
Smith 1991). However, this ignores that socioeconomic well-being is heavily stratified along 
both racial and skin color lines in Jamaica, as results show, and historical disadvantage is only 
compounded (Conley 1999), especially when there are no measures in place to address historical 
and contemporary structural discrimination and exclusion.  
This study has a limitation that should be noted when interpreting results. As noted 
previously, the portion of the sample than racially self-identified as non-black, specifically those 
who racially self-classified as white, Chinese, and East Indian, was very low in the Americas 
Barometer social survey on Jamaica although percent distribution of racial composition 
categories in the Americas Barometer surveys being similar to that of the Jamaican census. 
Having more individuals who self-classified as white, Chinese, and East Indian may offer 
alternative results. However, it is important to note that despite the sample size of non-black 
racial groups in the Americas Barometer on Jamaica, race was a significant predictor of the 
availability of basic household amenities and years of schooling when examined as a sole 
predictor.  
This study advances in our understanding of the dynamics of race and skin color in 
patterning overall social inequality as the utility of both race and skin color does indeed vary 
across context. In Jamaica, this paper’s results suggest that skin color was a stronger predictor of 
social inequality than race; however this does not lessen the fact that differences along race were 
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noted and significant, particularly when using census data. Hence, results show the importance of 
using both measures when studying social inequality (Bailey et al. 2014; Saperstein 2008; Telles 
2014) and point to the need for innovative approaches that challenge assumptions about the 
structure of racial and color hierarchies in Jamaica despite insufficient acknowledgement by 
Jamaicans (Kelly and Bailey 2018). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
My dissertation, “Jamaican Ethnic Oneness: Race, Colorism, and Inequality,” analyzes 
racial and skin color stratification in Jamaica, the impact of an ideology of racial mixing on 
Jamaican’s explanation for that inequality, and racial and nation-based identification. Robust 
generalizable studies of social stratification by skin color and/or categorical race are generally 
lacking with regards to the Anglo-Caribbean. Therefore, the case of Jamaica is theoretically 
important because it is an English-speaking society in the Caribbean, which like the U.S., was 
colonized by the British Crown. However, unlike the U.S., an ideology of racial mixing is 
salient, like some regions of Latin America. Additionally, Jamaica is an overwhelmingly Afro-
descent population, hence, overt privileging of non-black ancestry is constrained, and a color 
hierarchy is not always explicitly visible. 
Findings document (1) that an ideology of racial mixing/fusion strongly influences 
understandings of Jamaican national identity. (2) Contemporary construction of nationhood of 
are raced with Jamaicanness being equated to racial mixedness. Thus, the hybrid or creolized 
body and culture are made requirements for national belonging. (3) While issues pertaining to 
both race and colorism are not blatantly denied, race is generally viewed as a “U.S. problem,” 
while colorism is considered centrally an issue of the nation’s past. Instead, Jamaicans 
overwhelmingly focus on class for explaining social inequality rather than skin color or race, 
despite the salience of dramatic racial hierarchies in both wealth and educational attainment. (4) 
There is dramatic social inequality by skin color in Jamaica and a majority embrace of an 
ideology of racial mixing is negatively associated with Jamaicans’ recognition of racial 
discrimination. (5) Socioeconomic well-being across all dimensions is starkly structured along 
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categorical race and skin color as white advantage and black disadvantage are consistent features 
across all outcomes; blacks and those of darker skin shades have fewer BHA and years of 
schooling, have lower per capita household incomes, and experience more household 
crowdedness on average compared to their non-black Jamaican counterparts.  
While scholars, who have studied the Latin American case, argue that ideologies of 
creolization or racial mixing obfuscate and perpetuate racial discrimination (Bonilla-Silva and 
Glover 2005; Hanchard 1994; Paschel and Sawyer 2008; Warren and Sue 2011; Winant 1999) 
and that this ideology acts as ‘color blindness’ (Paschel 2010), ‘race-blindness’ (Sue 2011), 
and/or ‘false consciousness’ (Sidanius Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Winant 1999), this was not the 
case in Jamaica. While many Jamaicans strongly embrace an ideology of racial mixing31 this did 
not obscure or lead to a denial of racial discrimination. As I show in Chapter 3, specifically 
Table 3.1 which uses 2008 LAPOP data on Jamaica, over two-thirds of Jamaicans claim that 
racial discrimination it is an important element in structuring black poverty on the island. Forty-
three percent claim it is ‘very important’ and 30% claim it is ‘somewhat important.’ 
Additionally, from my qualitative interviews, while conflations were made with social class, the 
present of racism and colorism was not blatantly denied. These results are somewhat 
counterintuitive to group conflict theory (Bobo 1988; Bobo et al. 2012).  
Instead of ‘false-consciousness’ being at work in the Jamaican population, I argue that 
the mismatch between perceived preferential treatment and structural inequality exists because 
Jamaica does not collect or document such data. There is no statistical documentation, by the 
government or otherwise (aside from the Americas Barometer) of the impact race and skin color 
                                                          
31 Table 3.1 showed that half of the LAPOP 2008 sample rated the level of its belief in ethnic oneness as a seven 
(out of seven), and another 32 percent embraced the ethnic oneness orientation at the five-to-six level. Additionally, 
while not representative, all 5 of my interview respondents expressed this. This coincides with its popularity across 
most of the Americas, except the U.S. 
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on life outcomes (despite continual prompting to do so by the UN’s iCERD). For example, the 
Jamaican government does have any policies that regulate the use of race and/or skin color in 
hiring practices. The very absence of such policies may signify that such practices are not 
institutional, but overall restrict claims of racism and/or colorism in the nation to mere anecdotes. 
Thus, Jamaicans may tend to point to class as the more salient explanation for poverty or 
inequality as its connection to life outcomes is apparent from the economic circumstances of the 
nation.  
Overall, results point to the need for innovative approaches that challenge assumptions 
about the structure of racial and color hierarchies in Jamaica. My work makes use of categorical 
race and skin color, analyzed as two distinct dimensions of the construct we call “race.” Using 
both measures offers a more nuanced examination of racial inequality and highlights the 
heterogeneity within a majority Afro-descent population, oftentimes treated as a monolith. 
Furthermore, it problematizes the non-racial frame and rhetoric dominant in Jamaica, in the 
region at large, as well as U.S. conceptualizations of race. Thus, my dissertation makes important 
advances in our understanding of racial dynamics in patterning overall socioeconomic wellbeing, 
the variation of the utility of both race and skin color across contexts and complicates race 
inequality discourse by highlighting the heterogeneity within the black diaspora. Additionally, it 
moves beyond commonsense notions of race and highlights how the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses to interrogate the complexities of race can leverage important insights.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interview Guide 
Introduction: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. Today I am going to ask 
you different kinds of questions about your experiences growing up here in Jamaica. I will be 
recording the interview, and if there are any questions you don’t want to answer or don’t want 
recorded just let me know. Do you have any questions before we get started?     
 
Racial/Skin Tone (and Class) Classifications 
1. How would you describe yourself in terms of your physical features and skin shade? 
2. How would you describe your family and closest friends in terms of physical features and 
skin shade? You do not need to give specific details but you can generalize in your 
description with yourself as the reference point. That is, how they do they compare to you in 
terms of skin shade and physical features.   
3. Can you tell me about a time in your life where you thought your physical features and skin 
shade mattered? This can be a specific episode and/or a phase in your life.  
a. How do think your experience differs from the experience of others, say your 
family and friends (who may be lighter or darker)? 
4. Many people speak Jamaican Standard English, patois, or a mixture of both. 
a. Was there a time in your life where you thought the way in which you spoke 
mattered? 
i. What do you think the way you speak says about you?  
ii. What do you think the way someone speaks says about them?  
1. Their education? 
2. Their class? 
3. Do you think skin shade factors into this? 
Race Relations 
5. According to the Jamaican census, the various groups of people that live on the island are 
black/Afro-descent, mixed, Chinese, Indians, and white. Thinking about these various groups 
of people, do you think that some people are above others in how much power and respect 
they have?  
a.  If so, how would you describe the relationship between these groups of people? 
Please provide as much details as you can. 
6. What do you think the lives of the people you placed in the different positions of the 
hierarchy are like?  
a. What are the kinds of thing people say about them? 
7. Give Social Distance Scale: [After table is filled in by interviewer, several probes will follow 
depending on which groups they list as being more willing to have particular social contact 
with. Some probes are (but not limited to):] 
a. How does ethnic background or skin shade factor into whom you choose to date 
or marry? 
b. Some people feel that their skin shade is a help at work, and some people feel that 
it is a hindrance. What is your experience? Do you think it matters in anyway? 
c. How do you think where you live affect how comfortable you are with particular 
groups? [more probes here to ascertain differences between rural and urban areas] 
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Jamaica National Identity 
8. The national motto of Jamaica is, “Out of many, one people.” In reference to the different 
groups of people you see or know of that live on the island, what does this mean to you? 
a. If you had to describe someone, who would you say is the ‘ideal’ representation 
of what it means to be Jamaican? 
b. Are there any people living on the island that do not fit that image?  
9. Some people say that the motto of the country shows or symbolizes the unity among the 
Jamaican people and that despite our differences we Jamaicans have many things that unite 
us as a country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
a. Why do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
b. Do you think most Jamaicans believe this? 
10. To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican? 
 
Perceptions and Experiences of Colorism/Racism in Jamaica 
Introduction: Now I am going to present a few scenarios. These scenarios represent real 
situations that have taken place in Jamaica. After reading these scenarios, I am going to ask you 
your opinion about the scenarios. 
 
11. Usain Bolt said in a recent interview that he has experienced racism in Jamaica. The 
particular event he referred to was an incident with Jinx, Sean Paul’s wife, who complained 
that he was playing his music too loud and that she wished he would “return to where he was 
from”.  
a. What do you think of this situation? Do you agree with Usain that it was about 
race/color or do you believe that it had nothing to do with race/color? 
b. Can you think of a situation or event when you have experienced something 
similar to Usain? 
i. If not to you, can you think of a situation where something similar happened 
to someone you know? 
c. What did you think of the event at the time? Did you share this experience with 
anyone?  
i. If yes, how did you relate the situation? 
ii. Can you recall their reaction to your experience? 
d. Do you think that racism/colorism exits in Jamaica? 
12. Some Jamaicans have stated that for several years now, the girls that (whatever association 
that does miss. Jamaica) have been selecting for Miss World or Miss Universe have all been 
light-skin or possess particular features (explain) and that there is a bias in this selection. 
Others have countered thus by stating that skin-shade doesn’t matter because we are all 
Jamaicans and the girls selected from these pageants represent the country well, particularly 
in terms of appearance.  
a. What do you think about this debate? Which point of view do you agree with 
more? Why? 
13. There was a documentary done in 2013 by Diane Jackson-miller on TVJ which investigated 
skin-bleaching in Jamaica. In this documentary a lot of the individuals interviewed who 
bleached their skin stated that the reason they did so was to appear more attractive, get better 
jobs etc.  
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a. What is your opinion on skin bleaching or toning? 
b. In your opinion, what are some reasons why individual would bleach their skin? 
c. Do you think that the claims made or reasons given above for bleaching have any 
truth to them?  
d. Some people state that most of the individuals who bleach their skin are working-
class/ poor people. Do you agree or disagree with this assessment? Why? 
14. Now thinking of persons who are poor in Jamaica, I’m going to read to you some possible 
reasons or causes why people are poor in Jamaica. For each cause, state how important you 
feel that cause is in holding people back, or in keeping them poor and why. 
a. Laziness, little or no ambition. 
b. Lack of equal opportunity in Jamaican Society. 
c. Poor money management. 
d. Prejudice and discrimination against persons because of their color or race. 
 
Effects of Travel on Perceptions and Experiences of Colorism/Racism   
15. If you have lived aboard for more than a year, what are some similarities and/or differences 
in Jamaica and there in the way you think people are treated based on their physical 
appearance and skin shade? 
a. Can you tell me about a time while living aboard that you thought you were 
treated differently based on your physical appearance and skin shade in the 
country you were in? 
16. If you have family or friends that live aboard, they may have had conversations with you 
about the treatment they have received based on their skin shade. If they have spoken to you 
about such matters, what have they said and what do you think about these conversations you 
have had with your family and/or friend(s)? 
 
Race Questions 
17. What do you think ‘race’ mean? 
18. What do you think racism is? 
a. Do you think racism is present in Jamaica? 
b. Can you explain why you think that? 
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APPENDIX B 
Amended Bogardus Social Distance Scale 
Instructions: Below is a table with a list of scenarios. Thinking about the different groups of 
people that live on the island, rank how comfortable you would be in the listed scenarios if the 
person was from one of these groups. List your ranking from 1 to 5 with 1 being the most 
comfortable and 5 being the least comfortable. Remember to give your first reactions in every 
case. Give your reaction to each as a group and not based on the best or the worst members that 
you have known.  
 
 
 Black/Afro-
descent 
Whites Chinese Indians Mixed 
Would have as your political leader(s)      
Would marry or become family with 
through marriage 
     
Would be friends with      
On my street as neighbors or living in 
the same community 
     
Going to the same school or working 
alongside me in my job 
     
Attending the same church or religious 
service 
     
As citizens in Jamaica      
As visitors to Jamaica      
Would expel from Jamaica      
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APPENDIX C 
Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) Skin Color Palette 
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APPENDIX D 
Full Model of Relative Risk Ratios from Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of 
Respondents’ Sentiments of the Importance of Color/Race Prejudice and Discrimination 
Explaining Black Poverty, 2008 (N= 1,126) 
 
Source: Americas Barometer, Jamaica 2008. 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤ .01, *p≤ .05 
 
 
 Somewhat Important vs. Not Important Very Important vs. Not Important 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ethnic 
Oneness  
            
   Low  .764 .763 .763 .760 .760 .761 1.532* 1.545* 1.544* 1.550* 1.554* 1.552* 
 
   Medium  
   High 
1.090 
- 
1.051 
- 
1.058 
- 
1.059 
- 
1.058 
- 
1.072 
- 
.795 
- 
.796 
- 
.792 
- 
.792 
- 
.780 
- 
.783 
 
- 
 
Black  1.031 1.037 1.037 1.039 1.027  .896 .892 .891 .894 .890 
 
Female   .912 .911 .910 .923   1.082 1.083 1.076 1.082 
 
Age    .998 .998 .998    1.001 1.001 1.001 
 
Urban area     1.104 1.096     2.524*** 2.518*** 
 
Years of 
schooling 
completed 
     .992      .997 
